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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the dilemmas that both democratic and democratizing states face 
while dealing with terrorism-related problems. This problem has been equally pressing to 
a country like Uganda because it has been experiencing the problem of terrorism while 
undergoing the process of democratization. Much of the discussion boils down to 
whether and at what point forceful measures against terrorism protect or imperil the 
democracy. The challenge is how to balance counterterrorism measures and uphold 
democratic principles.  
The thesis discusses various approaches and experiences used by democratic 
states, using the United States and the United Kingdom as examples in tackling the 
problem of terrorism. From a policy perspective, immediately after 9/11, leaders from the 
United States and the United Kingdom introduced broad new authorities and legal 
measures in such laws as the U.S. Patriot Act and The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security 
Act of 2001 of the UK. Using the experiences of these countries, Uganda adopted similar 
approaches by introducing the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002, through which 
counterterrorism efforts have been handled.  
This study concludes by identifying some of the contradictions brought about by 
the new policies and examining their impact on both developed democracies and 
democratizing states like Uganda. 
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Democratic governments face a dilemma of protecting civil liberties and 
protecting the nation, especially in times of crisis. Immediately after 9/11, for example, 
U.S. leaders introduced broad new authorities and legal measures in such laws as the 
USA Patriot Act.1 In the same vein, the government of Uganda enacted the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2002, responding to its own internal and regional threats of terrorism. 
Ugandans met the Anti-Terrorism Act with mixed feelings, much the same way that 
American citizens are skeptical about the Patriot Act in regard to their civil liberties, and 
ultimately to the security of the nation. Much of the discourse boils down to whether and 
at what point forceful measures to protect or imperil the democracy. The challenge is 
deciding how to balance counterterrorism measures while upholding democratic 
principles. 
The question is, if anything, more pressing in a democratizing state like Uganda.2 
Uganda, as a political entity, has been engaged in democratization since 1986, when the 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) assumed the leadership of the country. Thus, 
Uganda’s democratic institutions are relatively new, and in some cases still taking form. 
On the other hand, Uganda finds itself in a tough neighborhood, which includes the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Kenya, with many direct and 
regional neighbors that struggle with post-colonial development and internal conflicts 
amid their own first steps towards democracy. And while neighboring Kenya presents a 
more stable polity, it shares with Uganda at least one major regional/transnational 
terrorist threat in the form of Al-Shabaab. In other words the sense of danger to the 
1 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001),  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/html/PLAW-107publ56.html   
2 Freedom House 2014 rates Uganda as partly free in terms of democracy based on three factors: 
freedom ratings, civil liberties, and political rights. The rating is on a scale of one to seven, where one is the 
best and seven the worst. Freedom House gives Uganda a 5.0 freedom rating overall, with a 4.0 in civil 
liberties, and a 6.0 in political rights. This ranking reflects well on Uganda’s democratic progress since 
1986. Notably, Uganda scores 4 out of 7 on issues of civil liberties, meaning that even when it is dealing 
with the problems of terrorism, it still observes and protects civil liberties. 
1 
Ugandan state and the government is as real and pressing as the country’s democratic 
progress. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How does the experience and example of the United States and Great Britain 
affect Uganda’s approach and its outcomes? What reforms and new policies could help 
resolve the tension within the current legal framework for counterterrorism and, 
ultimately, advance Uganda’s democratic progress? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Over the last few decades, terrorism has taken center stage in world politics, 
presenting one of the biggest security challenges in many countries, particularly in the 
democratic and democratizing world. Examples of such countries include the United 
States (2001), the United Kingdom (2005), Spain (2004), India (2008), Turkey (2003), 
Indonesia (2002), and Bulgaria (2013). During this period, many countries adopted 
various counterterrorism measures. The United States and the United Kingdom have been 
at the forefront in the fight against terrorism, using such legal instruments as the USA 
Patriot Act and the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act,3 respectively. These laws 
both formed and reflected the prevailing view of the prominent democracies on how to 
respond to the terrorist threat at home and abroad since September 11, 2001. Much of the 
rest of the world followed suit, including Uganda, which introduced the Anti-Terrorism 
Act of 2002.4 That is to say that in its effort to combat terrorism, the government of 
Uganda has adopted counterterrorism policy based on the U.S. and UK models.  
Policy makers in countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, 
including Uganda, insist that even a democratic state—perhaps especially a democratic 
state—must provide security to its citizens as well as guarantee their civil liberties. The 
matter becomes more complicated when terrorist or even criminal elements seek to 
3 United Kingdom: Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 [United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland] (2001) c. 24, 14 December 2001, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3de73e8e4.html .  
4 Malinda S. Smith, Securing Africa: Post-9/11 Discourses on Terrorism (England: Ashgate, 2010), 
107. 
2 
exploit these civil liberties against the state and polity that holds them so dear. By some 
reckoning, civil liberties may seem to represent weaknesses built into a democratic state, 
hamstringing the government in its response while cloaking the planning and 
communications of terrorists and criminals.5   
This viewpoint—and the laws that it informs—forms a serious challenge to 
democratized states because some of these government actions seem to contradict 
national laws that are already in existence. For example, in Uganda, under the Anti-
Terrorism Act, the security agencies carry out arrests of alleged terror suspects. The 
citizens allege that the arrests are carried out arbitrarily, without any justification, and use 
disproportional force. Worse, they do not lead to a free and fair trial, as Ugandan law 
today requires.  
Domestically, Uganda has been facing two ongoing insurgencies for more than 
two-and-a-half decades: the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the northern parts of the 
country, and the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) in the west.6 In addition, the country has 
also been challenged by transnational terrorist threats and actions mainly from Al-
Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda offshoot operating from the neighboring countries of Kenya and 
Somalia. For instance, on July 11, 2010, Al-Shabaab carried out twin suicide attacks in 
Kampala, Uganda, leading to the deaths of 74 innocent civilians; an additional 89 people 
were injured.7  These attacks qualified Al-Shabaab as a transnational terror group posing 
a major threat to Uganda.8 
5 John Ashcroft, Never Again: Securing America and Restoring Justice (New York, Center Street, 
2006), 134. 
6 Wafula Okumu, Domestic Terrorism in Africa: Defining, Addressing and Understanding Its Impact 
on Human Security (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2009), 77, 
http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/31087/1/TERRORISMREPORT.pdf?1. 
7 Max Delany and Jason Straziuso. “Uganda Bomb Attack Kills Word Cup Fans: Al-Shabaab 
Suspected in Kampala explosions,” Huffington Post, July 11, 2010, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/11/uganda-bomb-world-cup_n_642336.html.   
8 BBC News, “Al-Qaeda around the World,” August 5, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
13296443.  
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The main purpose of this study is to explore the particular challenges that 
democratizing states face in combating terrorism while maintaining the civil liberties of 
their citizens. The existing literature on the subject offers a wide range of divergent 
explanations relating to democratizing states that were hitherto undemocratic. With the 
collapse of communism in the 20th century, many countries—especially from Eastern 
Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Africa—witnessed the regime changes from 
authoritarian governments to democratic regimes. These regime changes have advanced 
the movement toward democratization in many countries that were under the 
authoritarian rule. However, Gene Sharp notes that problems of poverty, crime, and 
bureaucratic inefficiency are still prevalent in most societies despite the downfall of such 
regimes.9 To alleviate such problems, and to achieve societies that are free and secure, 
states must consolidate democracy. 
1. Consolidation of Democracy 
Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl’s writings on democracy give a crystal 
clear analysis of those factors that are most relevant to a successful transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy.10 They acknowledge that, for the transition to materialize 
there should emerge among the people a sense of national unity as a mutual 
understanding after experiencing a serious conflict. This development must also be 
accompanied by the existence of conscious democratic rulers who understand and can 
advance the noble cause for democracy.  
Their work is supplemented by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, who offer a 
detailed definition of a consolidated democracy in the following terms: 
Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no 
significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors 
spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by 
9 Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation (Boston: 
The Albert Einstein Institution , 2010), 2. 
10 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not,” in Transitions to 
Democracy, ed. David Arter (Brookfield, Vermont: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995), 76. 
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creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign 
intervention to secede from the state. 
Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority 
of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and 
institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a 
society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem alternative is 
quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces. 
Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when the 
governmental and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory 
of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of a 
conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned 
by the new democratic process.11   
These definitions suggest that there is more than one type of consolidated democracy. 
The authors also point out that it is unwise to assume that all the given conditions 
guarantee everlasting democracy. Democracy wants careful and constant tending. 
Nevertheless, they further argue that a democracy is consolidated when five arenas are 
developed and function as follows: a free and lively civil society, a relatively autonomous 
and valued political society, a rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens’ 
freedoms and independent associational life, a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new 
democratic government, and an institutionalized economic society.12  
A discussion of the conditions and values that favor democracy is of crucial 
relevance in this study because the absence of such conditions hampers the progress of a 
consolidated democracy. For democracy to thrive, Schmitter and Karl contend that 
“specific procedural norms must be followed and civic rights must be respected.”13 From 
this standpoint, one can ably argue that democracy offers conditions that protect civil 
liberties, which, according to Seung-Whan Choi, offer favorable conditions that 
11 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 6. 
12 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 7. 
13 Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not,” 80. 
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encourage the citizens to gain confidence in their government and discourage them from 
engaging in violence.14 
This point, however, does not mean that such conditions work on their own to 
promote democracy and eventually lead to the consolidation of democracy. On the 
contrary, other conditions are necessary to enable the consolidation of democracy. 
Dankwart A. Rustow points out that those civil liberties cannot guarantee consolidation 
of democracy when the citizens do not have a sense of national unity.15 National unity is 
one thing that determines the success of consolidation of democracy because citizens put 
aside issues of ethnicity, religion, and culture with aim of building their nation. As Linz 
and Stepan have indicated, the promising democracies try to avoid some of the issues 
pertaining to politics that led to stateless problems or put a mechanism in place of 
resolving such problems.  
For example, Spain, according to Florina Cristiana Matei and Jose A. Olmeda, has 
successfully consolidated after transitioning from the longest dictatorship in the world. 
Spain’s success is attributed to the willingness of the military to hand over power to 
civilian control, which is a sign of national unity.16 On the other hand, Larry Diamond, 
Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset indicate that most African countries have failed 
to unite because of lack of national unity. They argue that most African countries are 
divided along the lines of ethnicity and lack political culture, forming the main sources of 
conflicts in many African countries that hamper the progress of democratization.17 
14 Seung-Whan Choi, “Fighting Terrorism through the Rule of Law?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
54, no. 6 (June 2010), 941, doi: 10. 1177/002200271071666. 
15 Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not,” 73. 
16 Florina Cristiana Matei and Jose A. Olmeda, “Executive Civilian Control of the Military (Spain),” 
in The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Publishers Graphics, 2013), 188. 
17 Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries 
(London: Adamantine Press, 1988), 10. 
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2. Terrorism and Democracy 
In the literature on terrorism and democracy, two terms appear with frequency: 
anti-terrorism and counterterrorism.18 The difference between these terms is important, 
especially when dealing with terrorism in democratized states. Daniel Byman notes that 
anti-terrorism measures are designed as defensive actions to prevent the occurrence of 
terrorism—as opposed to counterterrorism measures, which are offensive in nature and 
are designed to respond to terrorism acts.19 In both instances, governments must design a 
method by which to combat terrorism without compromising civil liberties, while at the 
same time upholding the democratic principles of the state.  
Similarly, Alex Schmid indicates that when democracies are faced with terrorism, 
the main dilemma is between “acceptability “and “effectiveness.”20 Counter-terrorism 
measures, therefore, must be acceptable to a democratizing society in terms of being 
accountable to the citizens. The measures must be effective against a particular type of 
attack. This observation implies that in fighting terrorism, there is a need to make a hard 
preference: either sacrificing some democratic core principles in order to be successful 
against terrorism, or tolerating some level of terrorism in order to maintain the civil 
freedom and rights cherished in a democracy.  
Richard English, in support of effectiveness rather than muscular counterterrorism 
measures, argues that strong counter-terrorism measures make terrorist groups overreact 
in the form of retaliations. He notes that a well-balanced response to terrorist incidents 
avoids prolonging the threat of terrorism.21 His definition of terrorism may help in 
understanding the relationship between terrorism and democracy: 
Terrorism involves heterogeneous violence used or threatened with a 
political aim; it can involve a variety of acts, of targets and of actors; it 
18 Brigitte L. Nacos, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism,” Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Columbia 
University, 2012), 212. 
19 Daniel Byman, The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (New Jersey: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2008), 53. 
20 Alex P. Schmid, “Terrorism and Democracy,” Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 (1992): 14, 
doi: 10.1080/095465592084271773.  
21 Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 55.  
 7 
                                                 
possess an important psychological dimension, producing terror or fear 
among a directly threatened group and also a wider implied audience in 
the hope of maximizing political communication and achievement; it 
embodies of power relation; it represents a subspecies of warfare, and as 
such it can form part of a wider campaign of violence and non-violent 
attempts at political leverage.22  
His definition of how governments should respond to acts of terrorism is 
particularly helpful as it appears that some acts may turn out to be political, as was the 
case of Nelson Mandela during his struggles against apartheid in South Africa.  
Conversely, there are some instances where democratizing states endeavor to put 
in place avenues through which the citizens can resolve their grievances without resorting 
to violent means. Instead, terrorist groups take advantage of conditions in the democratic 
systems to engage in terrorism activities. This argument justifies Eubank and Weinberg’s 
analysis indicating that democracy and terrorism go together—meaning that democratic 
states are more likely to experience terrorism activities than non-democratic states. Their 
main argument is that democracy provides conditions that help terrorism to thrive.23 Paul 
Wilkinson augments the same argument, noting that terrorists take the advantage of the 
inherent freedom existing in the democratic society, exploiting their freedom of action 
without any interruption from the state.24 In addition, terrorists also exploit freedom of 
speech to criticize government and incite violence. For example, Hitler and Mussolini 
were able to destroy the democracies of Germany and Italy, respectively, by taking 
advantage of the freedoms their democratic societies offered.25  
Eubank and Weinberg further assert that democracies are sometimes a major 
target to terrorism as a result of the groups and issues external to the conflict.26 For 
instance, in 1998, the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killed at 252 
22 English, Terrorism, 24. 
23 William Lee Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, “Terrorism and Political Violence: Does Democracy 
Encourage Terrorism?” Terrorism and Political Violence 6 no.4 (December 2007), 417, doi:       
1080/09546559408427271. 
24 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (London: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2002), 23.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Eubank and Weinberg, “Terrorism and Political Violence,” 160. 
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people, including twelve U.S. citizens, and injured more than five thousand.27 
Significantly, these terrorist attacks were basically foreign to the countries in which they 
were carried out—countries that, it might be added bore the heaviest costs in terms of 
casualties and property damage. Eubank and Weinberg cite some other instances in 
which various European, African, and Latin America democracies, including American 
facilities in other countries, have been major targets of terrorist actions. The argument 
holds that the attacks are, in the first instance, due to the resentment over the global role 
of the United States (now seen as a successor to the European colonial powers of the 19th 
century); they encouraged the possibility of extensive coverage in the America-
dominated mass media.28  
3. The Democratic Response 
Paul Wilkinson asserts that there are decision-making dilemmas in the fight 
against terrorism that include intelligence work, prevention efforts, offensive actions, 
legislative efforts, punitive actions, media coverage, and morale and psychological 
warfare.29 They are key elements that must be considered by policy makers without 
government compromising democratic principles. The main problem faced by 
democratizing states in the fight against terrorism is making a decision as to which 
approach to use that is acceptable and effective.  
Likewise, Alex P. Schmid argues that anti-terrorism measures must be in line with 
policies that are consonant with the conditions of democracy.30 However, in most cases, 
the extent to which both aims must be achieved remains the subject of debate. In the first 
place, to be effective in fighting terrorism, some civil liberties may end up being 
sacrificed. And in doing so, the state will be violating human rights—something for 
which human rights activists have long put Uganda in the uncomfortable spotlight.  
27 BBC News, “1998: U.S Embassies in Africa Bombed” August 7, 1998, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/7/newsid_3131000/3131709.stm.  
28 Eubank and Weinberg, “Terrorism and Political Violence,” 163–164. 
29 Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 94. 
30 Schmid, “Terrorism and Democracy,” 17. 
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a. The Neighborhood Effect 
The country’s location may sometimes turn out to be a geographical curse 
depending on the security situation in the region. John Davis notes that Kenya, for 
example, has a border that stretches along the Indian Ocean, which is a gateway to the 
rest of the world, including to terrorists.31 In addition, Kenya is a very close neighbor to 
Somalia, a country that has been involved in civil wars for more than two decades. These 
conflicts in Somalia have had a serious spillover effect on Kenya’s internal security 
problems, especially from the Al-Shabaab militants. This problem is one of the biggest 
challenges being faced by many countries in Africa.  
The remedy for this problem, according to Byman, is to transform the terrorist- 
breeding countries into democratic and conflict-free states.32 This is one the main 
objectives of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to pacify the country and 
deny terrorist the breeding ground.33 Similarly, the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism 
Initiative, a U.S counterterrorism program based in West Africa, has been instrumental in 
helping in the fight against terrorism in countries that have been acting as breeding 
grounds for terrorists in the Maghreb.34  
Governments adopt and implement a whole range of policies and measures in 
order to fight and prevent further terrorist strikes originating from the neighboring 
countries. Searching out terrorists, launching strikes, punishing supporters of terrorists, 
improving security measures, and intensifying watchfulness measures are all parts of a 
large counterterrorism strategy. Thus, according to this literature, counterterrorism 
encompasses tactics and strategies adopted in response to terrorism incidents.35  
31 John Davis, Africa and the War on Terrorism (London: Burlington Ashgate, 2007), 46. 
32 Byman, The Five Front War, 79. 
33 Cecilia H. Wiklund, The Role of African Union Mission in Somalia (Stockholm: FOI, Swedish 




34 Smith, Securing Africa: Post-9/11, 94. 
35 Nacos, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism,” Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 212. 
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Scholars using the neighborhood approach take the view that democratic reforms 
and incentives will not, by themselves, end terrorism in a given state because of the 
neighborhood in which the country is located. (Uganda fits this case, with its neighboring 
countries engulfed in perpetual conflicts.) With the neighborhood effect, Schmid writes, 
contemporary democracies are exceptionally susceptible to terrorist actions.36 There is 
freedom of movement in modern democracies; people are free to come and go without 
the kind of close watch that often exists in closed nations. Likewise, there is freedom of 
association in democracy; the state does not prevent individuals with the same mind from 
forming a private organization to associate.  
Moreover, the same open societies provide opportunities to terrorists with several 
targets to strike. In the same way, the legal systems in open societies require the 
presentation of evidence, attestation of guilt, and various due process protections before 
someone can be incarcerated for participating in terrorist activities as demanded by 
democratic principles. This fact justifies the argument of those scholars who assert that 
because democracies promote high levels of civil liberties, including the legal rights of 
the accused, terrorists are undeterred and undaunted because, if they are caught, the 
accused terrorists are assured of their legal rights. Schmid also points out the relative ease 
with which potential terrorists are able to obtain weapons and move across borders in and 
around the same geographic neighborhood.37 
A study by Mirza Daniel and Thierry Verdier concluded that, to counteract the 
diffusion of neighborhood terrorism, democratic governments must put into practice all-
inclusive security measures.38 These measures, which encompass homeland security, 
should be directed both within the confines of the country’s borders and in the 
neighboring countries from which terrorism may emanate.  
36 Schmid, “Terrorism and Democracy,” 22–23. 
37 Schmid, “Terrorism and Democracy,” 25. 
38 Daniel Mirza and Thierry Verdier, International Trade, Security and Transnational Terrorism: 
Theory and a Survey of Empirics, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4093 Washington, DC: 
World Bank Research Group, Trade Team, 2006, 
https://www.openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9282/wps4093.pdf?sequence=1  
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On Uganda’s military interventions in neighboring countries, Uganda’s president 
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, who took power in 1986, while addressing the Parliament on 
September 16, 1998, said that “if the neighbor’s house catches fire, the fire can spread 
also to your own house; if there is fire in the next house you get out and see what is 
happening.”39 In support of his argument, many observers note that during Museveni’s 
regime, new developments in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) geopolitical conflict were 
recorded, like the Burundi coup of 1986, the Rwanda invasion of 1990 and the 
subsequent genocide in 1994, and the invention of Zaire in 1996. All these incidents 
forced Uganda to redefine its national security interests.  
As John F. Clark notes, like other interventionist states—notably the United 
States and Great Britain—Uganda grossly misjudges the high risk of interventions and 
will therefore most likely become entangled in many of its involvements well beyond the 
expected scale and scope. At the same time, however, he asserts that Museveni’s efforts 
have has earned him a good relationship with the Western powers.40 This has been a 
result of Museveni’s open condemnation of terrorist groups and the support in the fight 
against international terrorism. 
b. The International Effect
The second approach is the international effect. This approach raises questions 
concerning the relationship between democracy and human rights at an international 
level. Bram B. Van Riezen and Karlijn Roex observe that the application of civil rights to 
all of the world’s citizens or only residents of a certain state or a group of states depends 
on whether one adopts a nationalist standpoint.41 The rationale, according to Ghai Nodia, 
39 “Museveni’s Address to the Sixth Parliament on the 16th September 1998, Hansard,” last updated 
2015, 
http://www.parliament.go.ug/new/index.php/component/ninjarsssyndicator/?feed_id=1&sa=U&ei=sVxtU7
P0LNHhsATZn4GwCA&ved=0CCMQFjAB&usg=AFQjCNEpdpE4ZK5dIytUiat1lqVxTZMrJw.   
40 John F. Clark, “Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo: Evidence and Interpretations.” The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 39, 2 (2001), 261, doi: 10.10.1017/S0022278X01003615. 
41 Bram Van Riezen and Karlijin Roex, “Counter-Terrorism in the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom: A Comparative Literature Review Study.” Counter-terrorism; United Kingdom ; Netherlands; 




is that people who share similar national characteristics (for example, language, ethnicity, 
or culture) are less likely get involved in disagreements in regard to democratic issues.42 
The theory behind this reasoning is that in most cases, nationalism and democracy 
overlap because the citizens are united under one nationality. 
However, from the global perspective, democracy refers to a “global citizen.” 
Many scholars argue that, in a time of terror, states must develop a more fluid sense of 
self, going beyond the issues of nationality and ethnicity to recognize being human as the 
first and most basic identity. This shift implies that the focus of rights shifts from the 
citizen to the human being. Sjursen questions whether global rights are essentially 
democratic and argues that there is a concern between the ideas of global rights and the 
principles of democracy.43  
c. The Legal Approach 
Paul Wilkinson identifies some of the approaches that democratic states have 
successfully applied and managed to defeat terrorists without sacrificing the democratic 
process.44 Among the approaches Wilkinson writes about are hardline and overt 
appeasement. He argues that even as the overt appeasement approach aims at offering 
terrorist concessions in form of amnesty, which automatically pardons terrorists without 
going through the judicial process, some terrorists still do not give up, forcing states to 
take the hardline approach. For example, Italy in the 1970s, despite being a democratic 
state, adopted the hardline approach when authorities introduced new laws to help fight 
the Red Army terrorists. According to Wilkinson, Italy was able to defeat these terrorists 
using this approach without diverting from its democratic principles. Italy’s success story 
against terrorism, using the legal approach, sets a precedent for the future use of the legal 
approach to prevent terrorist attacks in democratic states. 
42 Ghia Nodia, “Nationalism and Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, 3 no. 4 (October 1992), 4. 
43 Helen Sjursen, “The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Quest for Democracy.” 
Journal of European Public Policy 18, no. 18 (December 2011): 1069–1077, doi 
.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.615192. 
44 Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 98.  
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On the other hand, the legal approach may backfire and cause more harm than 
good, especially when the government targets its own people by denying them liberal 
freedoms or arresting the innocent or, alternately, when the laws keep shifting to suit the 
interest of the state. Steve Hewitt argues that such laws not only fail to end terrorism but 
may actually fuel it, especially when the people become frustrated as a result of 
government actions—or overreactions.45 He notes that when the British government was 
fighting the Irish Republican Army (IRA), it introduced law after law to facilitate the 
conviction of terrorists. The laws themselves did not curtail IRA terrorism, however. 
Instead, such laws increasingly infuriated the citizens who accused the government of 
torturing people. Worse, the IRA used these laws as an excuse to advance its cause by 
portraying itself as the defender of the minority.46 As Nacos notes, British laws have 
greater power in dealing with acts of terrorism to the extent of detaining a terrorist 
without any criminal charge.47 But the British experience also demonstrates some of the 
pitfalls of flexing the legal framework to achieve particular counterterrorism goals. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Democracy has been promoted in many countries as a means to fight terrorism; 
the Bush Administration and its defenders and allies advanced this position in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The premise behind this theory is that terrorist grievances are usually about 
disenfranchisement, injustice, inequality, lack of economic opportunities, 
marginalization, and government abuse of power. Democracy, as this theory assumes, 
offers people avenues through which power sharing, justice, rule of law, equal 
opportunity, participation, and freedom from government abuse can be achieved. Each of 
these conditions translates into democratic principles and practices that protect 
individuals’ basic rights; promote the rule of law, freedom of expression, and regular 
elections; and separate the powers into the executive, legislative, and judicial branches 
for checks and balances, mutual accountability, and transparency. Thus, democracy 
45 Steve Hewitt, The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism on the Home Front 
Since 9/11 (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008), 19. 
46 Hewitt, The British War on Terror, 16. 
47 Nacos, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism,” Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 214. 
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establishes conditions under which the citizens can freely participate in their governance 
without being oppressed—and without resorting to violence.  
A victory against terrorism is not about the destruction of the terrorist, as Audrey 
Kurth Cronin notes, but winning over the hearts and minds of the local population 
through negotiations with terrorist groups.48 Democracy is both the means and the end of 
this process. 
The NRM government began the path of democratization immediately when it 
assumed power in 1986.49 From that time, the country has been able to safeguard peace 
and security of life and property throughout the country, safeguard and consolidate the 
democratic and constitutional order, consolidate and improve such social services as 
schools and health-care services, and conduct general elections under the system.50 These 
programs have been hampered by some cases of insecurity in some parts of the country, 
leading temporally to the suspension of programs in the affected areas. Terrorism and 
insurgency thus limit democratic progress in some of the areas that most need these 
gains. Moreover, the use of the military in the fight against terrorist groups not only 
strengthens the appeal of terrorists or insurgents, but in some other cases, it may end up 
introducing new cycles of terrorism. 
By the same token, none of the democratic reforms and other incentives the 
government has put in place will end terrorism in the country when countries neighboring 
Uganda are still engulfed in perpetual conflict. For one thing, Uganda has become 
actively involved in perhaps all the major conflicts of the GLR of Africa—Rwanda, 
Burundi and the Congo, even extending to those in the Greater Horn of Africa, the Sudan 
and Somalia being the present cases. Uganda’s geographical location (surrounded by 
countries that are conflict-prone) implies options for terrorists with safe havens on either 
48 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011), 37. To be 
sure, in many cases, terrorists take advantage of the grace period during negotiations to reorganize and 
replenish their weapons and supplies. The LRA terrorists have used this tactic on several occasions 
whenever they run short on logistics or under intense pressure from government enforcement agencies. 
49 Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, Sowing The Mustard Seed: The Struggles for Freedom and Democracy 
in Uganda (Kampala Uganda: Moran Publishers, 2007), 195. 
50 Tarsis Bazana Kabwegyere, People’s Choice, People’s Power: Challenges and Prospects of 
Democracy in Uganda (Kampala Uganda: Fountain Publishers Ltd 2000), 140. 
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side of the border. A terrorist who has liberty of action in a sanctuary provided in the 
neighboring countries will not give up such freedom in preference to government 
democracy, which also subjects him or her to the rule of law.  
This conundrum complicates Uganda’s response to insurgency and terrorism 
because it inspires a foreign policy that may not accord with the ideals of global 
citizenship,51 and it diverts precious resources—time, money, and effort—from those 
programs, policies, and institutions that would advance Uganda’s democratization. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to find out what democratic governments do to avoid or mitigate the ill 
effects of counterterrorism while trying to achieve satisfactory results against a terrorist 
threat, I focus on case studies in which state policies against terrorism failed to bring the 
intended results even after a long period of time. This focus also helps clarify how to 
balance counterterrorism and protect civil liberties of human beings. In addition, I also 
use other scholarly information and other sources like government reports that contain 
information about government policies that could be relevant to this study. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis has five chapters. The first contains the introduction, which details the 
general background information about the relationship between counterterrorism policies 
implemented by governments and how they affect the process of democratization.  
Chapter II maps out the development of counterterrorism efforts in Uganda, 
analyzing the background, the major constitutional reforms, and other legal changes, plus 
the changes in Uganda’s security organizations that are a response to terrorism. It 
discusses Uganda’s counterterrorism efforts in the areas of criminal justice model and the 
military model, which takes terrorism as an act of radical warfare with the dispatch for 
response placed on the military and entailing the use of the troop development. 
51 Smith, Securing Africa: Post-9/11, 134. 
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The following chapters look at the cases of United States, especially the USA 
Patriot Act, which suspended rights and civil liberties in unprecedented manner, and the 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF); and the United Kingdom, where 
the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act led to indefinite detention without trial 
measures for non-nationals suspected of being capable of, or implicated in, terrorist acts. 
In both cases, the focus is on the negative effects of counterterrorism on democratic 
institutions, ideals in these countries, and, by extension, ideals in Uganda as it 
democratizes with the United States and Britain as its examples. In the concluding 
chapter, all the findings of the study are gathered, and I make recommendations on how 
to deal with terrorism in a democratic state. 
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II. COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICIES IN UGANDA  
Uganda’s counter-terrorism measures, dealing with both domestic and 
international terrorist threats, fall into three different categories: the criminal justice 
model, the military model, and coordination with international conventions. In the 
criminal justice model, terrorism is perceived as a crime, with the burden of response 
falling on the state’s regular criminal legal system. In the military model, terrorism is 
regarded as an act of warfare placed within the remit of the armed forces. A third 
category leverages international conventions in tackling acts of terrorism transnationally.  
The models matter because countering terrorism poses significant challenges to 
the protection and promotion of democratic principles. Over the years, terrorism has 
increased in both sophistication and scope, taxing the criminal justice systems and the 
militaries of all nations alike. The growing terrorist threat has also prompted international 
organizations to redesign their mission to account for the changing security environment 
emanating from terrorism threats. This chapter, therefore, analyzes the Republic of 
Uganda’s counter-terrorism response in terms of these models. It investigates the 
criminal-justice and military systems in collaboration with intelligence coordination to 
determine whether they have been effective and efficient in dealing with terrorism. It also 
discusses Uganda’s compliance with international counter-terrorism conventions, 
emphasizing Uganda’s reasons for compliance.  
A. UGANDAN LAW AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE MODEL 
The criminal justice model considers terrorism to be a criminal act and prescribes 
the use of law to fight it.52 The law enforcement approach to combating terrorism 
involves legislation, criminal prosecution, and incarceration.53 It begins with an 
understanding of terrorist activity as a form of criminal conduct, which has implications 
for interventions aimed at tackling it. The conventional institutions for fighting crime—
52 Nadav, Morag, Comparative Homeland Security Global Lessons (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons 
Inc, 2011), 65. 
53 Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 113. 
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the police and the judiciary—are also those responsible for combating terrorism. The 
police have the primary responsibility of enforcing anti-terrorism laws in collaboration 
with other state agencies involved in the criminal justice system. Both institutions are 
supported by intelligence, which is the first line of defense against any threat to national 
security. 
1. Laws and Legislation 
Uganda, like other countries using the criminal justice model, has taken a 
measured approach by legislating to prevent and punish terrorism. The basis of this 
approach is a framework of laws that define terrorism, its predicates, and the appropriate 
measures to combat it.  
a. Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 
In wake of the 1998 bomb attacks in Kampala, perpetrated by ADF militants, as 
well as the 9/11 attacks in the United States, Uganda enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act of 
2002 as the main legislative weapon for fighting terrorism in the country and beyond.54 
The act defines terrorism as “any act of violence or threat of violence carried out for 
purposes of influencing government or intimidating the public and for any political, 
religious, social, and economic aim, indiscriminately without due regard for the safety of 
others or property.”55 The law supersedes the Penal Code Act, which was initially used 
for formulating various penalties for suspects who committed offenses of capital nature. 
All offenses related to terrorism are handled under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The 
Anti-Terrorism Act criminalizes anyone involved in running a terrorist organization or 
any organization that promotes, publishes, and disseminates news or materials that 
facilitate terrorism activities.56 In line with this section of the act, the Ugandan 
government has been able to list four terrorist organizations. Under the second schedule 
54 Prior to 2002, the Fire Arms Act of 1970 had provided for the regulation of fire arms and 
ammunition; the Penal Code Act, Section 23–25, had managed punishment of treason and its concealment. 
55 Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 passed into an Act of Parliament in 2002, http://www.ulii.org/content/anti-
terrorism-act-2002. 
56 Ugandan Anti-Terrorism Act, Section 9.  
 20 
                                                 
of the act, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Lord’s Resistance Movement, Allied 
Democratic Forces/Front, and Al-Qaeda have been gazetted as terrorist organizations.57 
Furthermore, the act criminalizes anyone who supports or assists a terrorist organization, 
and also penalizes whoever makes any contribution of funds or any other resource to a 
terrorist organization. 
The act provides for coordination between the law enforcement institutions and 
judicial jurisdiction over terrorism. It also permits terrorism investigations, interception 
of communications, and surveillance as key parts. Financial intelligence has gained value 
as a key tool in fighting terrorism.58 The central idea in this approach is that if terrorist 
organizations are starved of financial resources, their capability to carry out terrorist 
activities will be totally degraded. 
The Uganda Anti-Terrorism Act criminalizes terrorism but contains neither 
regulatory nor enforcement mechanisms.59 This is true because in some cases it becomes 
difficult to practically monitor and enforce the law due to lack of required capacity in 
terms of skilled manpower and equipment. The new law also paints terrorism in broad 
strokes—which may cover more offenses than its proponents supposed. For example, the 
act defines acts of terrorism as manufacturing, handling, or detonating a lethal device in a 
public place; involvement in murders, kidnapping, abduction, or maiming of any 
person;60 or actions that attempt to influence the government or intimidate the public.61 
The law does not distinguish between plainly criminal acts and terrorist ones and, thus, 
seems to bring many acts into the category of “terrorism,” whether or not they were so 
conceived or undertaken.   
57 Anti-Terrorism Act (2002), Section 10(1)(6). 
58 Nacos, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism,” Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 168. 
59 Tabu Butagira, “Porous Borders, Graft Expose Uganda to Terrorist Attacks─US,” Monitor Newspaper, June 3, 
2013, http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Porous-borders--graft-expose-Uganda-to-terrorist-attacks-US/-
/688334/1870446/-/mlty1g/-/index.html. 
 60 Anti-Terrorism Act of Uganda, Section 7. 
61 Ibid. 
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b. Anti-Money Laundering Act  
Money laundering fosters criminal activities and threatens the progress of 
financial systems. To strengthen the Anti-Terrorism Act, an appropriate anti-money 
laundering legal framework regulating the formal and informal financial services industry 
and trade services is a prerequisite for the successful disruption of financial flows to 
terrorists.62 Uganda enacted the Anti-Money Laundering Act in 2013 to combat such 
activities.  
Section 3 of the act proscribes financing of terrorism activities as a crime. Any 
irregular transactions suspected to be connected to a terrorist finance fall under the Act. 
The Bank of Uganda subsequently issued guidelines to all financial institutions to follow 
especially the “know your customer principle” and requires bank personnel to report 
suspicious transactions and financial activities,63 aim to combat terrorism.  
The Anti-Money Laundering Act covers crimes committed within Ugandan 
territory as well as those committed outside the country. Moreover, the act is applicable 
whenever the crime is committed, irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator. This 
extensive reach is useful in tackling issues created by cross-border crime, particularly the 
financing of international terrorism.  
The use of financial interdiction64 to deny terrorist organizations access to 
financial resources faces a number of practical and operational challenges. In the first 
place, new modes of transmitting money are constantly evolving, especially the Internet 
and other informal methods like the Hawala system. The major challenge, however, lies 
with the proliferation of informal systems and mobile money services operations65 in 
Uganda, which may act as conduits of terror-related financing opportunities. Money 
62 Nacos, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism,” Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 169. 
63 Statutory Anti-Money Laundering Regulations of 2010. 
64 Under Section 18 of The Anti-Money Laundering Act, the government set up a Financial 
Intelligence Authority (FIA), which is an independent institution. This institution coordinates with the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global institution responsible for fighting money laundering in the 
whole world. 
65 Mobile Money Service is operated by Telecom companies, with some partnering with banks. This is 
e-money available to a mobile phone user. 
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wired through mobile money services can be withdrawn by anyone without identification 
across the country at any service point. This unrestricted access to funds, coupled with 
the informal nature of the economy, means that a significant amount of Uganda’s 
economic life, including potential terrorism-related66 transactions, transpires outside the 
formal banking systems.  
Although the law criminalizes contributions to terrorist organizations, Brigitte L. 
Nacos points out that some organizations have been providing conduits through which 
terrorists access funds, a unique situation that has been difficult to deal with. Relatedly, 
intelligence reports suggest that some Islamic charities may be the sources of terrorism 
funding in the Horn of Africa.67 In an event where some organizations in the country are 
suspected to be conduits of terrorism financing, the act empowers the government to have 
them deregistered and their bank accounts frozen.68  
c. The Interceptions of Communications Act 2010 
The 2010 Interceptions of Communications Act and its regulations enhance the 
Anti-Terrorism Act by providing for lawful surveillance/interception of communications 
in Uganda.69 The law requires intelligence agencies to apply for warrants to monitor and 
or intercept communications and mandates all telecommunications service providers to 
register their clients. Surveillance includes interception of letters and postal packages of 
any person; interception of telephone calls, faxes, emails, and other communications 
made or issued by or addressed to a person; and monitoring of meetings of any group of 
persons. Other powers include the surveillance of movements and activities of any 
person, electronic surveillance of any person, access to bank accounts, and searching of 
the premises of any person. The act says that the purposes for which interception or 
surveillance may be conducted include the safeguarding of the public interest, prevention 
of the violation of fundamental and other human rights and freedoms of any person from 
66 Nacos, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism,” 168. 
67 Shariah Finance Watch available at http://www.shariahfinancewatch.org/blog/ 
68 Anti-Money Laundering Act, Section 61 (I) (4). 
69  Regulation of Communications Act, 2010 HC 18, September 3, 2010. 
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terrorism, prevention or detecting the commission of any offence, and safeguarding the 
national economy from terrorism. 
2. Other Legal Reforms  
To strengthen counterterrorism policies put in place, it is necessary to make 
structural reforms so as to provide a framework through which such policies can be 
implemented and supported. As a result, Uganda has had to make structural changes in 
some of its institutions in order to adequately meet the demands of the newly created 
laws. This section discusses the structural reforms in border controls, police forces, and 
legal coordination within East African region through which a number of legal actions 
have jointly been undertaken.  
a. Border Control 
Despite the legal framework in place and cooperation among partner states, there 
is a problem of movement of people across the borders, encouraged and exacerbated by 
the tribal linkages between the people on either side of the borders. After all, the borders 
of most African states today owe to the boundaries between colonial areas in the 19th and 
20th centuries. As such, ethnic boundaries do not coincide with state borders, and groups 
regularly traverse the state borders.  
This constant fluidity is further aggravated by the porous borders of Uganda.70 
This kind of movement allowed terrorists to establish cells and carry out attacks 
undetected. Cases have been registered where some of those arrested and charged with 
terrorism offenses in Uganda had entered the country without travel documents. They 
passed through unofficial entry points along the borders with Kenya and South Sudan and 
boarded vehicles to Kampala; Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda operatives have exploited these 
weaknesses to move easily and freely into Uganda and in the region.71 The problem of 
porous borders is further compounded by the laxity of immigration control at various 
border entry points, and the poorly equipped, corrupt, and poorly paid security personnel.  
70 Geoffrey B. Kambere, “Countering Al-Shabaab: A Case to Minimize Transnational Terrorist 
Threats against Uganda” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011).  
71 Ibid. 
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Uganda is a democratizing state, but it is surrounded by neighboring states that 
are engulfed in enduring internal conflicts, which in their turn have created security 
problems for Uganda. Uncontrolled populations, especially immigrants, as well as 
internally displaced and stateless persons, all create hubs for the spread of radical 
conspiracies that both impede stabilization and export terrorism to other targets and 
audiences.72 For example, the inability of the Kenyan government to control its borders 
with a country like Somalia has enabled the Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda terrorists to carry 
out attacks against Uganda. 
Monitoring porous borders is an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task. The 
LRA rebels long operated in the largely lawless border regions of the DRC, Central 
Africa Republic (CAR), and South Sudan. The U.S. Special Operations Commander for 
Africa, Rear Admiral L. Losey, indicated that the LRA leader Joseph Kony has been able 
to elude capture as a result of taking advantage of porous borders.73 This point 
underscores the great need for capacity and improvement in security measures to enable 
immigration and border control officials to identify and apprehend suspects attempting to 
enter or exit the country. 
In sum, international judicial cooperation against terrorism, as Wilkinson notes, 
remains weak because of the differences in legal codes and procedures, and the absence 
of extradition treaties between states. Moreover there are enormous variations in the 
levels of specialist knowledge of terrorism in national judicial systems. Uganda has few 
lawyers specializing in terrorism and at the same time does not have special prisons for 
keeping terrorist suspects. The lack of such facilities and capacity may undermine 
Uganda’s efforts to use law enforcement as a tool for fighting terrorism. 
72 Martha Crenshaw, “Political Explanations”  In Addressing the Causes of Terrorism, the Club de Madrid Series 
on Democracy and Terrorism 1 (2005), 14 . http://safe-democracy.org/docs/CdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-1.pdf.  
73 Rear Admiral L. Losey is a current commander of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). It 
assists in building regional security capacity and relationships in Africa.  
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b. Police Restructuring (Reforms) 
Wilkinson notes that liberal democracies entrust police with the task of combating 
terrorism on top of its routine duties of maintaining law and order in the country.74 In 
addition, Wilkinson goes further and underlines the importance having a specialized anti-
terrorism police unit within the security services to manage terrorism threats effectively. 
In order to augment the legal systems, the Uganda Police Force underwent through 
reforms and created a new Directorate of Counter-Terrorism (CT) with Aviation, 
Tourism, and Crime Intelligence among the sections under it. These reforms were meant 
to have an enhanced police response to terrorism threats. As the Uganda police adapted 
new reforms, the new unit created still faces some problems. In the first place, the unit 
lacks specialized training in management of such critical specialized areas as crisis 
response team and bomb disposal.75 This bottleneck is still hampering the effectiveness 
of new police counter-terrorism unit. 
The critical question is whether Uganda has a police force that is competent to 
deal with the threat of terrorism. The force lacks the enabling infrastructure that is 
important in fighting terrorism. Other than the lack of enabling infrastructure, the force is 
underfunded, and yet without funds, the force cannot acquire the necessary skills or 
equipment to enable it to perform its functions adequately.  
To deal with the problems of limited capacity and competency, Uganda has 
sought help from its allies. The United States has responded by proving financial support 
that has been used to build a well-equipped forensic laboratory and also facilitated 
training programs to the force.76 In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
provided substantial resources that helped in the investigations of the 7/10 terror 
bombings in Kampala. This assistance has not only been useful in capacity building, but 
was also timely and helpful to the counter-terrorism police because through such 
assistance, CT was able, for example, to apprehend all the 7/10 perpetrators.  
74 Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 113. 
75 Monitor Newspaper, “Counter-Terrorism Takes Over Four Police Units,” September 30, 2011. 
76 Beth Elise Whitaker, “Compliance: Africa and the Counter-Terrorism Regime,” Review of 
International Studies (2010), 653, 36,693-662, doi 10. 1017/S02602151000641.  
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A well-equipped counter-terrorism police unit is instrumental in handling 
terrorism related cases more especially in a democratizing state, where some of the 
institutions are not strong enough to handle terrorism-related cases. In Uganda’s case, 
counter-terrorism police have the mandate to investigate, arrest, and carry out a detailed 
scene examination, especially the recovery of evidence from bomb scenes. This kind of 
evidence helps the judiciary to build good cases against the accused terrorists, who 
otherwise would end up not being convicted due to lack of incriminating evidence.  
B. MILITARY MODEL 
The military model is based on the idea that the use of military force and methods 
can effectively undermine terrorism. It emphasizes the marshalling of all military means 
in order to quash a terrorist threat or action.77  From this perspective, terrorism is 
regarded as an act of warfare or insurgency. The military model does not work in 
isolation, however; it must be supported by intelligence efforts in order to be effective. 
1. Military Intervention  
In Uganda, military offensives have been carried out against the LRA and ADF 
particularly in the northern and western parts of the country. As a result, the LRA was 
pushed to the extreme areas of the CAR; and the ADF, to the jungles of the DRC.78 
Although this intervention could have brought relief to the people in northern and 
western Uganda, the unstable political climate in the neighboring countries of DRC and 
South Sudan have provided safe havens for these elements. However, the use of 
diplomacy has enhanced Uganda’s position to allow the Uganda People’s Defence Force 
(UPDF) to pursue these groups across borders.79  
The use of military power to dismantle terrorist cells, especially in 
counterinsurgency strategies, has proved to be the weapon of choice for many 
77 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 115. 
78 Okumu, Domestic Terrorism in Africa, 77. 
79 Simon Mulongo, “Report of Conflict Assessment in the East Africa Partner States, 2010,” East 
African Community, April 22, 2010, 
https://www.academia.edu/4102864/Report_of_Conflict_Assessment_of_EAC_Partner_States_fin . 
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countries,80 including Uganda. However, some scholars have questioned the efficacy of 
the military approach. For example, Richard English, in his book Terrorism: How to 
Respond, contends that a militarized response is unlikely to defeat terrorism. He argues 
that preemptive action by security forces cannot succeed in taking out every potential 
terrorist but instead infuriates the terrorists who act in retaliation.81  
These observations about the efficacy of the military model in undermining 
terrorism are supported by experiences of Uganda. In Uganda, military pressure on the 
LRA, ADF, and Al-Shabaab has failed to suppress their operations. While it may be 
argued that the LRA and the ADF have been weakened, they still constitute a serious 
challenge to the security of the state and civilians in the region. The military approach in 
Uganda has been associated with killing some members, especially top leaders of the 
terrorist groups. But as Byman observes, killing some members of terrorist and insurgents 
groups is only successful in the short term because those leaders are easily replaced.
82
 
Thus, little is gained by removing the top leaders of a given group.  
Uganda’s military strategy has faced formidable challenges. In the first place, the 
complex natures of the LRA and ADF, and the versatility with which they can traverse 
international borders, have overstretched the Ugandan military both in terms of personnel 
and resources. Second, geopolitical factors also have limited the capacity of the Ugandan 
military to disrupt the LRA and ADF terrorist groups. For instance, efforts to pursue the 
LRA and ADF in the jungles of South Sudan and DRC have been dented by these 
countries’ refusal to grant the Ugandan troops access to areas affected by the terrorists. 
The DRC government has a deeply engrained suspicion of the Ugandan army’s intentions 
on its soil, which represents a major hindrance in the fight against the LRA and ADF, 
which groups use DRC territory as a safe haven.  
80 Jason Burke, The 9/11 Wars (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 25. 
81 English, Terrorism, 54. 
82 Byman, The Five Front War, 113. 
 28 
                                                 
The United States supports Uganda’s military approach to defeating the LRA. In 
May 2010, the U.S. Congress passed the Disarmament Bill.83 This measure was followed 
by the deployment of 100 combat-equipped U.S. troops on October 12, 2011. General 
Carter Ham, the head of the U.S. military’s Africa Command, asserts that the troops will 
remain deployed until the LRA group is totally defeated.84 U.S. support has provided 
Uganda government with a strong counter-terrorism partnership for fighting terrorists, 
and, hopefully, the LRA will be eliminated in the region.  
In addition, Uganda’s involvement in the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) under the auspices of the African Union’s (AU) efforts to defeat terrorism in 
Somalia and the Horn of Africa raises further challenges in its efforts to defeat terrorist 
organizations in Uganda. Uganda is a leading contributor of troops to the AMISOM, 
whose current deployment, however, is too small and underequipped to effectively defeat 
terrorist groups, such as Al-Shabaab, operating in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has on many 
occasions used roadside and suicide attacks against AMISOM troops, resulting in many 
Ugandan military fatalities. Moreover, there is mistrust between AMISOM and the 
Somali National Transitional Forces (TFG), which further exacerbates the problem and 
which, to some extent, has hampered Uganda’s efforts to fight Al-Shabaab in Somalia. 
2. Intelligence Coordination 
Intelligence is an important component in helping to combat terrorism. The 
Ugandan intelligence community has been credited for being able to thwart Al-Qaeda 
attacks against the U.S embassy in Kampala in August 1998.85 This success was 
attributed to the coordination of East African intelligence services in sharing and 
exchanging of intelligence information about the terrorist networks that were operating in 
the region. 
83 Andre Le Sage, “Countering the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa,” Strategic Forum, 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=134652. 
84 Washington Post, “U.S Troops to Stay in Uganda until Kony Is Found,” November, 21, 2011. 
85 David H. Shinn, “Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn,” The Journal of Conflict Studies 27, no. 1 
(2007), http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/5655/6658 . 
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The security forces have formed a Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATT) as the 
coordinating interagency unit to enhance the fight against terrorism.86 JATT is composed 
of personnel from the military intelligence agencies, police, the Internal Security 
Organization (ISO), and the External Security Organization (ESO). Before the 1999 
attacks, the security forces police, military, intelligence agencies, and security private 
firms worked independent of each other. The lack of coordination led to duplication of 
roles and uncoordinated strategies to the management of terror attacks. For instance, 
between 1997 and 2002, the ADF network was able to detonate more than 48 explosive 
devices, killing at least 50 and injuring more than 200 people.87 At that time, there was 
no security agency specifically detailed to handle the emerging threat of terrorism. 
Extensive coordination among government institutions and intelligence agencies, 
according to Wilkinson, produces precise intelligence.88 Only when effective coordination 
of intelligence services and resources is established can the authorities hope to undermine 
the operational capabilities of the terrorists groups, a matter that JATT aims to solve.  
To strengthen the efforts of JATT, the police component reinvigorated the 
community policing approach so as to increase the participation of local communities in 
general crime prevention but with more focus on terror threats. The public is the first line 
of defense as “watch guards” for any suspicious elements in their neighborhood and 
report to police. This plan requires the population to be vigilant because the security 
agencies will not be everywhere at all times. This drive has been through mass 
mobilization and sensitization of the local people over the national radio, as well as using 
any other form of education, information, and communication materials and other 
sources.  
But there are challenges to terrorism-related intelligence gathering. The marked 
lack of collaboration and coordination among the various intelligence and security organs 
can undermine efforts to combat terrorism. The lack of collaboration and coordination 
86 Whitaker, 652. 
87 James J. F. Forest and Jennifer Giroux, “Terrorism and Political Violence in Africa: Contemporary 
Trends in a Shifting Terrain” Perspectives on Terrorism 5, no. 3–4 (2011), 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/152/html. 
88 Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 106. 
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among intelligence services not only affects Ugandan intelligence services but has also 
been highlighted by many scholars as one the main intelligence failures that contributed 
to the 9/11 terror attacks.   
Yet the development of effective intelligence and cooperation among intelligence 
agencies has been earmarked as critical in preventing attacks.89 Other than depending on 
internal intelligence, Uganda continuously shares intelligence information with other 
particular foreign partners. The Ugandan government observes and cooperates closely 
with other countries on intelligence sharing of terrorist organizations and their activities. 
However, the level of cooperation and collaboration among governments and states may 
be undermined because of mistrust and reluctance to share certain information. 
Consequently, intelligence may flow in one direction rather than in a quid-pro-quo 
fashion.  
Wilkinson observes that such mistrust often impedes an effective international 
response to terrorism. Further hindrances include serious wars and bureaucratic 
tendencies, coupled with the fear to reveal sensitive information and sources.90 As a 
result, intelligence on terrorist is not given in a timely manner to other services at home 
and abroad. This delay of information diffusion undermines counterterrorism efforts. 
In all, the use of a military approach does not resonate well in the fight against 
terrorism, because military actions create situations that make the fight against terrorism 
much harder as they seek to balance between democracy and combating terrorism. 
Military actions lead to loss of lives, which otherwise would have been avoided. It also 
subjects the population to the excesses of war that emerge during the course of war. 
These actions are exhibited in the form of atrocities and violation of human rights 
committed against the population. Additionally, some of the military offensives 
conducted outside the borders of country have in turn created strained relationships with 
the neighboring states. For instance, in one of the offensives against the ADF, the 
government of Uganda invaded the DRC with the aim of denying the ADF access to the 
89 Byman, The Five Front War, 83. 
90 Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 110. 
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DRC as a springboard to attack Uganda. However, this action infuriated the DRC, which 
took such as action as an act of aggression. Later on, the DRC accused Uganda of 
invading, a case that has put Uganda on the spotlight for taking illegal action against 
another state.91 
C. COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM 
CONVENTIONS 
Uganda has signed numerous international counter-terrorism conventions with a 
desire to implement international obligations aimed at combating international terrorism. 
The conventions were bargained mainly through the United Nations and other 
international organizations.  
1. The Signed International Conventions  
Uganda signed and ratified the following international conventions for preventing 
acts of terrorism: the Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful acts against the Safety 
of Civil Aviation, signed on September 16, 1976; the Convention for Suppression of the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including 
Diplomatic Agents, signed on December 4, 1979; and the Convention against the Taking 
of Hostages, signed on November 10, 1980. Through these conventions, Uganda has been 
placed in a secure position against any terrorist incident, especially on the side of aviation 
and its citizens on board. This compliance has greatly improved Uganda’s capacity in the 
fight against transnational and domestic terrorism on top of being a member of 
international conventions on terrorism. In addition, Uganda is an ally of United States of 
America and other Western powers that are in the forefront of fighting terrorism. This 
alliance has helped Uganda improve its counter-terrorism capability and capacity 
building through training its personnel in various skills and knowledge. 
Additionally, at the helm of international counter-terrorism conventions lies the 
UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), formed in 2001 to monitor the implementation 
of UN Security Council Resolution 1373. Accordingly, UNSCR 1373 mandates all 
91 Peter Nyanzi, “Uganda Found Guilty of Invading and Looting Congo,” Daily Monitor, December 
20, 2005. 
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nations that are members of the UN to have enabling laws, including creating laws that 
criminalize terrorism-related offenses.92 As a result of this resolution, many countries, 
including Uganda, have established anti-terrorism acts to deal with terrorism-related 
cases and are also required to submit periodic reports to the CTC on their efforts to 
criminalize, prevent, and punish terrorism-related activities.  
At the regional and sub-regional levels, Uganda is a member of several bodies and 
has adopted agreements and protocols to tackle the dangers of terrorism. The 
organization most related to Uganda is the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism espoused in 1999. Since 9/11, 
the African Union (which succeeded the OAU) has reaffirmed its commitment to 
combating terrorism through a protocol of the 1999 convention. Even though the regional 
agreements are limited in the use of force in the fight against terrorism, they represent 
another commitment that is very profound in response to terrorism. The most obvious is 
the compliance with the international legal instruments and financial muscle support.  
At the present time, Uganda is cooperating with other nations in an effort to 
combat terrorism in regard to sharing intelligence information, joint operation, and 
training exercises. In line with international efforts, Uganda was among the first countries 
to support the U.S. war on terror when the United States attacked Afghanistan and Iraq in 
the fight against terrorism.93 Thus, Uganda benefited from the support that the United 
States extended to Kenya and Tanzania in the improvement of the aviation security and 
borders controls and regulations.94 The support has greatly reduced the level of threats to 
the aviation industry, which has been a favorable target to the terrorists.  
On the other hand, detractors have been accusing the government of “doing 
mercenary work in exchange for financial support and other forms of foreign aid.”95 As a 
result, Uganda has been associated with U.S. policies, making it vulnerable to terrorist 
92 James Beckman, Comparative Legal Approaches, Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland 
Security and Anti-Terrorism (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007). 
93 Whitaker, 652. 
94 Ibid.  
95 Ibid.  
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attacks. Nonetheless, by and large, Uganda’s level of compliance with the international 
counter-terrorism conventions has been quite high. 
2. The International Framework 
Terrorism is multinational and crosses borders. True regional efforts have been 
put in place to combat terrorism in the East African region with occasional support from 
one another and the greater extent in all states in the Great Lakes Region. However, not 
all states in the GLR have laws that can manage terrorism in its current form.96 Paul 
Wilkinson argues that much of anti-terrorism legislation is designed to “increase the level 
of protection of life and property by providing law enforcement authorities with the 
powers needed to assist them in the apprehension and conviction of those who commit 
crimes of terrorism.”97 As such, it is important for countries facing the problems of 
terrorism to have legal mechanisms in places that enable them to deal with transnational 
terrorists.  
International cooperation is important in the fight against terrorism because, in 
most cases, terrorists operate with and within different countries. Situations may emerge 
requiring states to share information on a terrorist incident or a need for extradition of a 
terrorist.98 Here, the criminal justice model plays an important role in instituting the laws 
that deal with both domestic and transnational terrorism. Nadav argues that the 
synchronization of anti-terrorism laws among democratic states lessen the burden of 
fighting terrorisms because similar laws will be used to deal with terrorism.99 The 
significance of synchronizing anti-terrorism was evidenced during the July 2010 
Kampala bombing. In this attack, the perpetrators were found to be the citizens from the 
East African countries and, therefore, handling those suspects did not present a lot of 
legal complications.  
96 East African Community Partner States establishment of the EAC in the region. 
97 Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 113. 
98 Morag, Comparative Homeland Security Global Lessons, 69.  
99 Ibid. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Terrorism is an extreme form of warfare that presents complex problems to any 
country facing it. The main problem of dealing with terrorism, especially in 
democratizing states, is trying to prevent the wrongs without violating civil liberties. This 
is particularly true because the general public may perceive government actions in 
countering terrorism as an infringement on civil liberties. The policies adopted to deal 
with the threat of terrorism while continuing to defend and uphold democratic principles 
are applied within the legal framework that covers the military and the international 
convention. Inasmuch as these approaches have attempted to deal with the problem of 
terrorism in the country, the approaches still face some limitations in regard to their 
application.  
Table 1 ranks the efforts, effectiveness, and challenges of laws and institutions as 
low, medium, or high based on their performance in terrorism prevention: 
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Table 1.   Efforts, Effectiveness, and Challenges of Laws and Institutions 
Laws and Institutions Efforts Effectiveness  Challenges 




High Medium High 
Interception of Communications 




High Medium High 


























High High High 
Compliance with International 
Conventions 
- International 
Organizations (AU, UN) 
High High Low 
 
The judicial system in Uganda is still in its infancy, so it cannot effectively 
preside over complex terrorism cases—not least because there are no competent judges to 
handle terrorism-related cases. In addition, Uganda lacks experienced and professional 
enforcement officers to carry out thorough investigations and come out with 
incriminating evidence to help judges decide such cases. This circumstance is worsened 
by the high degree of secrecy with which terrorists plan and execute their missions, hence 
making it cumbersome for enforcement officers to secure incriminating evidence against 
terrorist suspects.  
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The complex nature of terrorist conduct forces security agents to employ methods 
to extract information, which in the process may lead to a violation of human rights. 
Whereas the Ugandan constitution stipulates that suspects should be produced in courts 
within a mandatory period of 48 hours, this contradicts the Anti-Terrorism Act, which 
advocates holding terrorist suspects for a longer period. This is done to enable 
enforcement officers conduct detailed investigations that can lead to a successful 
prosecution of terror suspects. This contradiction, coupled with other challenges, makes 
some of the approaches fail to attain the intended objectives in the fight against terrorism 
in Uganda.    
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III.  UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM IN THE LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVE: THE U.S.-UK LEGISLATIONS AND THEIR 
RELATIONSHIP WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES 
This chapter aims to understand the legal approaches and experiences that 
established democracies bring to bear in tackling the problem of terrorism. This 
understanding will help inform decision-makers and other scholars about how legal 
instruments can be used or developed by democratizing countries like Uganda in making 
decisions and taking legal actions against terrorist acts.  
The United States and the United Kingdom serve as good examples for several 
reasons. In the first place, both countries have been strongly affected by terrorist 
activities, which put them on the forefront in the fight against terrorism. Second, both 
countries are good models of established democracies with which Uganda has a long-
established relationship. Uganda, as a former British colony, has a good reason to follow 
UK laws because Uganda’s laws were drawn on the British legal system—much as with 
the United States. Indeed, all three states embrace a common-law system, which means 
their legal systems have more in common with each other than they might share even 
with their closer neighbors and allies if the latter follow a code-law or positive-law 
system. Third, and most important, both countries have had a long history of fighting 
terrorism, which gives them experience that democratizing states can fall back on in their 
own fight against terrorism—that is, democratizing states need not start from scratch, so 
to speak.100  
U.S. domestic laws and law enforcement institutions underwent a considerable 
transformation immediately after the 9/11 attacks, shifting concentration from 
prosecution to prevention.101 U.S. approaches ranged from enacting new laws to setting 
100 While acknowledging the fact that the United States and the UK serve as good examples of 
countries fighting terrorism, they have heavily invested huge resources in terms of manpower development. 
They have institutionalized a sophisticated set of structures, such as judiciary, intelligence services, and law 
enforcement agencies. On the contrary, Uganda has not reached such level as to match the standards of 
United States and UK, despite the fact that it shares almost the same beliefs with these countries with 
respect to the global war on terrorism.  
101 Ashcroft, 131. 
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up an entirely new cabinet-level agency (the Department of Homeland Security), to 
attacking suspected terrorist hideouts in third-world countries, strengthening the allies, 
practicing diplomacy, and bolstering the country’s security mechanisms.102 While 
detractors lament the establishment of the “national security state,”103 the post-9/11 legal 
framework has been refined but, more importantly, largely upheld by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and Congress renewing the key statutes. 
Similarly, the UK has, on several occasions, amended regular criminal laws to 
deal with terrorism-related cases whenever a terror incident occurred. This was because 
the UK had long engaged in running battles with members of the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), which utilized terrorist tactics in their attacks.104 As a result, the UK had to devise 
means of containing the IRA within the legal framework with these periodic adjustments 
to the law. For instance, the 1974 Birmingham incident, when bombs exploded in two 
pubs, killing 21 and injuring 168 others, forced the UK government to pass new 
legislation in the form of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.105 This act defined terrorism 
“as the use of violence for political ends and any use of violence for the purpose of 
putting the public, or any section of the public in fear.”106 Specifically, this act came into 
force to define acts of the IRA as terrorist actions and to designate it as a terrorist 
organization. This act, however, did not stop such incidents. Instead, acts of terror 
increased, which compelled the government to keep amending the law until finally the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act was replaced by the Terrorism Act of 2000.  
Indeed, the situation began to change after the 9/11 attacks, in which 67 British 
citizens lost their lives, along with more than 3,000 Americans. In addition, after 9/11, 
the UK experienced a series of terrorist attacks and attempted attacks, most notably the 
suicide bombings of July 7, 2005, that targeted London’s public transit system. In the 
102 Byman, The Five Front War, 3–4. 
103 Jeremy Neff, “Does (FISA+NSA),”  “Does (FISA+NSA) - AUMF-Hamdi = Illegal Domestic 
Spying?” University of Cincinnati Law Review 75, no. 2 (2006): 901. 
104 Brendan O’Brien, The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein (New York: Syracuse University Press, 
1999), 216. 
105 Hewitt, The British War on Terror, 19. 
106 Ibid. 
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aftermath, the UK shifted from ad hoc laws to a program of overarching, considered 
counter-terrorism laws that, according to Kubosova, were “some of the toughest anti-
terrorism laws in the region.”107 The transformation of Britain’s legal framework has also 
developed within the UK’s democratic procedures and traditions, which at least suggest 
that far-reaching counter-terror measures are not necessarily antithetical to democracy. 
From a policy point of view, 9/11 forced the international community, led by the 
United States and the United Kingdom, to invest resources and manpower in the 
campaign against terrorism as well as in the promotion of democracy in many parts of the 
world. In this campaign, many democratizing states, including Uganda, have benefited 
from U.S. and UK aid, ranging from economic assistance, political and military financial 
aid, military training, and capacity building. In turn, the same states have reciprocated by 
supporting and promoting U.S. and UK policies in the war against global terrorism—
more especially in the promotion of the rule of law, which is one of the most essential 
factors for the liberal democracies. 
A. ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
AFTER 9/11  
Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States developed a legal system to defend 
homeland security purposely to deny Al-Qaeda and its associates another chance to attack 
the country. The main instruments included Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
and the USA Patriot Act. Critics of these laws—which may or may not invest sweeping 
new powers in fewer federal hands, or which may or may not remove much 
counterterrorism activity from public review and oversight, or which may or may not blur 
the civil-military boundary beyond all democratic tolerances—decried the pressure that 
this framework put on American civil liberties. However, defenders of such laws argue 
that civil liberties may not be used as the alibi of terrorists working to destabilize the 
country.  
This argument is reflected in President Bush’s address to a Joint Session of 
Congress on September 20, 2001: “We will direct every resource at our command—
107 Beckman, Comparative Legal Approaches, Comparative Legal Approaches, 51. 
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every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every tool of law enforcement, 
every financial influence, and every weapon of war—to the destruction of and to the 
defeat of the global terrorist network.”108 This statement contained carefully selected 
words that demonstrated the U.S. determination to fight the problem and its commitment 
to democratic principles. Arguably, this balance has held up. In the ten-plus years that 
have followed, most the laws enacted in the frantic period after 9/11 have more or less 
remained intact through the process of democratic review and revision.  
1. Authorization for Use of Military Force   
One of the key U.S. approaches is direct military intervention: invading countries 
where terrorists established their bases and rogue states that sponsor terrorism 
activities.109 Such military intervention is provided for under the AUMF, a Joint 
Resolution passed by Congress on September 20, 2001.110 The AUMF emphasizes the 
need to maintain national security, to address external threats to the United States (ideally 
while they are still external), and to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism. To 
conduct such activities, the president is authorized to use his inherent constitutional 
authority to collect intelligence necessary for the conduct of foreign and military 
campaigns.111  
This mandate is supported by the president’s constitutional authority to direct 
National Security Agency (NSA) activities, which are of vital importance in the 
interception of communications to or from the United States of persons with links to Al-
Qaeda or related terrorist organizations that have repeatedly vowed to attack the United 
States. In line with this argument, the NSA activities have all along been recognized by 
Congress as the fundamental method for conducting wartime surveillance, which 
108 U.S Department of Justice, “Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security 
Agency Described by the President (White Paper),” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, January 
19, 2006. 
109 Byman, The Five Front War, 129. 
110 U.S Department of Justice, 1. 
111 U.S Department of Justice, 7.  
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includes warrantless electronic surveillance against the declared enemy.112 Specifically, 
the AUMF has justified and undergirded the U.S. military interventions in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Somalia, as the United States has spearheaded the war against terrorism 
especially against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups associated with Al-
Qaeda, like Al-Shabaab.  
Under this resolution, the president was given the authority to use “all necessary 
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized or aided the attacks of September 11th.”113 In the first instance, “all 
necessary and appropriate force” was and is assumed to include military intervention 
against the members of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban who had been linked to the 9/11 
attacks.114 The sweeping language of the authorization, however, marks a departure from 
previous authorizations that limited the powers of the president to declare war.115 
Detractors of the Bush Administration and the AUMF have responded with vehemence to 
the wide-open language of the authorization; operational practice has naturally 
constrained the United States’ grasp, if not its reach.116  
Although the AUMF and the subsequent military interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have registered such successes as the death of Osama Bin Laden, regime 
change in Afghanistan, and the forced entropy of Al-Qaeda into regional/transnational 
groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Qaeda in Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP), among others, terror remains a threat to the people of America as 
evidenced by the Boston Marathon bombings. Internationally, American interests remain 
threatened—for one broad example, there is the declaration of Al-Qaeda leaders arguing 
that all Muslims kill U.S. citizens and military personnel wherever they are in the world. 
The attack on the U.S embassy in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012—a day when 
112 U.S. Department of Justice, 11. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 William P. Rogers, “Congress, the President, and the War Powers,” California Law Review 59, no. 
5 (September, 1971): 1194–1214. 
116 Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 132.  
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the U.S commemorates 9/11—killed the U.S ambassador to Libya and three other U.S 
nationals.117 This incident and other ones that took place in Turkey’s Istanbul in 2013, 
targeting American missions, is a clear testimony that terrorists pose a serious threat to 
American interests anywhere in the world. With such a threat, some questions need to be 
addressed: Was the authorization open-ended to cover all areas that the U.S has been 
engaged in or where its interests are threatened? Can the recent threats posed by the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria be resolved through the use of AUMF?  
Military intervention has been faulted because of the controversies associated 
with it. For instance, it asserted unnecessary inherent executive war powers, which the 
White House has claimed are unlimited in the exercise of the president’s duties as 
commander-in-chief and as the protector of the national security.118 This issue is 
evidenced in the way the Bush administration took a decision to invade Iraq when there 
was no incriminating evidence linking it with terrorism activities, let alone the pretext of 
the weapons of mass destruction. At the international level, military intervention has also 
been associated with severe abuses in the form of torture and execution. Prisoners of war 
in detention are exposed to all forms of torture on the pretext of extracting information 
from them. The recent images portrayed by the media exposed all kinds of torture and 
abuses that American soldiers have been inflicting on the terror suspects.119 This kind of 
treatment of prisoners of war in Afghanistan and Iraq raises serious concerns among civil 
libertarians who wonder whether the American forces that were sent to restore democracy 
and freedom are doing the right thing in the name of America and its values.  
Similarly, the use of military drones, despite its benefits in collecting intelligence 
information, has been faulted for unintended consequences in countries like Pakistan and 
Yemen. This, coupled with targeting of remote areas, further alienates the United States 
from a local population that has no contacts with the terror groups. Nonetheless, drones 
have been beneficial to counterterrorism operations. More than 3,000 Al-Qaeda suspects 
117 CNN, “Benghazi U.S Mission Attack Fast Facts.” December 2, 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/10/world/benghazi-consulate-attack-fast-facts/.  
118 Neff, “Does (FISA+NSA),” 907. 
119 Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (New York: 
Random House 2007), 332. 
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have been killed in counterterrorist strikes through the targeted killings with the use of 
drones.120  
More often than not, drones have been deployed in Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia, 
targeting high-profile terrorists, like in the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, one of Al-Qaeda’s 
senior leaders who was operating in Yemen; and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a suspect in the 
attacks on two American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, who was hiding in Somalia in 
2009.121 Second, the issue of minimizing American casualties in war is another reason 
why drones have been used in countries where America does not expect maximum 
cooperation and is likely to lose a substantial number of its soldiers. In the same vein, 
Bradley Jay Strawser argues that, in order to protect the troops from unnecessary 
casualties, what he termed the “principle of unnecessary risk,” the United States is 
morally and ethically justified in the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).122 This is 
because the UAVs minimize the number of causalities and saves the lives of American 
soldiers without impairing the overall aims of the mission. Third, the use of drones is 
supported by AUMF statute, and the president is able, at will, to use all the necessary and 
appropriate force against any person who intends to attack the United States; therefore, 
the use of drones in the war against high value targets is justifiable within the law. 
Nevertheless, within the public realm, targeted killings are not the way of 
promoting democracy, especially in cases where drones land on the wrong targets. Civil 
libertarians argue that drone strikes have led to extrajudicial killings of people, whose 
identities are unknown, let alone to denying such people a legal due process. This kind of 
action puts the United States on the spot insofar as the protections of human rights are 
concerned. Besides, the kinds of attacks that drones are used for are similar to those of 
terrorists.     
120 Scott Shane, “Targeted Killing Comes to Define War on Terror,” New York Times, April 7, 2013. 
121 Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Expands Drone War into Somalia,” New York Times, 
August 31, 2011. 
122 Bradley Jay Strawser, Killing by Remote Control (Oxford: University Press, 2013), 17. 
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2. The Patriot Act 
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, commonly referred to as the 
USA Patriot Act, was enacted by Congress in 2001.123 The act aims to deter and punish 
terrorist acts in the United States. It was enacted to enhance law enforcement 
investigatory tools, and for other purposes. The Patriot Act, passed almost immediately 
after the 9/11 attacks, grants the government and especially the law enforcement agencies 
extra powers of investigation, ideally leading to the apprehension of many criminals that 
would otherwise not be in the system. Critics claim that it makes terrorists out of ordinary 
citizens exercising their constitutional rights and vests the government with far more 
unchecked power than it should have. 
To begin with, the law provides for what is called “sneak and peek” warrants 
where government law enforcement officers can search a person’s property without any 
warrant or notification.124 It also provides for information sharing between government 
agencies and permits wiretapping of every single form of communication, as well as the 
indefinite detention of any immigrant or non-citizen.125 Coupled with this measure is the 
inclusion of Internet surveillance laws, which helped the law enforcement agency to 
monitor the activities of terrorist groups through electronic surveillance.126  
Notwithstanding the advantages of such information sharing, unrestricted 
information sharing may lead to unconstitutional behaviors by collecting information on 
innocent citizens in a limitless form. For example, the U.S. Fourth Amendment provides 
protection of citizens against government power as further enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 
Solove observes that the U.S Constitution ensures that the “government cannot gather 
information about a person without putting proper oversight and limitation.”127 
123 Howard Ball, The USA Patriot Act: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, California, 2004), 33.  
124 Nacos, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism,” 215. 
125 Beckman, Comparative Legal Approaches, 27. 
126 Orin S. Kerr, “Internet Surveillance Law after the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t.” 
Northwestern University Law Review, no.  97, 2003, 34. 
127 Daniel Solove, Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2011), 93. 
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Accordingly, it requires any government official to obtain a court order with convincing 
or reasonable grounds before any form of surveillance or search is conducted against any 
individual. This is a kind of protection the Fourth Amendment is expected to offer to an 
individual when the government is trying to gather information from any individual. 
However, with the advent of technology, such protection is limited because in some 
instances, government can collect any information and carry out any form of surveillance 
on an individual the way it deems it necessary without going through legal procedures, in 
part because of the way the technology in the communication systems is designed. 
The other key component of the Act allows investigators to collect foreign 
intelligence with fewer restrictions as was in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) and the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, H.R. 3694, 
especially the non-specification of the telephone line or email to wiretap and the 
authorizing court. Thus, the tap attaches more to the targeted person than his or her 
specific devices; even if the suspect discards the gadget, he or she will still be tracked.  
However, this kind of electronic surveillance has been criticized for the 
infringement on the civil liberties. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has 
openly labelled the law and legislation that strips the American citizens of their privacy 
and freedoms128 as enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and, for that matter, in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There have been calls to have the act 
reconsidered, especially Section 215, which empowers enforcement officers to obtain any 
kind of information they regard as connected with terrorism, irrespective of anyone in its 
possession.129 However, the law only provides amendments to several provisions, and the 
focus on only the controversial sections negates the overall purpose of the act. The 
domestic spying program that allows enforcement officers to conduct warrantless 
domestic spying is in total contravention of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
128 American Civil Liberties Union, Reclaiming Patriotism: A Call to Consider the Patriot Act (New 
York: ACLU, March 2009), http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/patriot_report_20090310.pdf. 
129 Ibid. 
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(FISC) because AUMF changed the rules regarding domestic electronic spying in 
response to the ongoing war on terror.130  
Using the same law, government agents are given the opportunity to access 
individual records at such places as libraries, banks, bookstores, Internet providers, and 
insurance companies without going to FISA court or having any form of oversight.131 
The only concern is how such information is stored and used because in some cases, it 
can land in the wrong hands and be used against an individual in prosecution, which puts 
American citizens in considerable doubt against government actions.132 In addition, the 
rate at which the government is conducting electronic surveillance using the modern 
electronic technology is threatening most American citizens fearing that their 
communications have been tapped into and listened to. This kind of surveillance is not 
only invasive of someone’s privacy, but it also limits one’s freedom of 
communication.133 A reason why the ACLU has decided to engage the government in 
court battles is get a better interpretation that adheres to the democratic principles 
enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. 
In the final analysis, the AUMF reiterated the presidential constitutional powers 
outlined in the Patriot Act that justify the NSA program, which included the authority to 
conduct warrantless surveillance as a way of correcting intelligence for the purposes of 
waging war against terrorism. Based on these laws, U.S citizens have been subjected to 
domestic spying, which they consider a violation of their constitutional rights and civil 
liberties. The ACLU claims that the provisions of the AUMF are overly broad and are in 
conflict with FISA of 1978.  
Where the AUMF empowers the president to use force for the protection of the 
U.S citizens, the Patriot Act enforces the existing laws that deal with the realities of 
terrorism, especially on issues related to methods of information correction. These laws, 
however, were not passed with the intentions of violating rights and freedoms of the 
130 Neff, “Does (FISA+NSA),” 891. 
131 Posner, Not a Suicide Pact, 134.
132 Solove, Nothing to Hide, 25. 
133 Posner, Not a Suicide Pact, 136. 
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American citizens. Problems arise with respect to the legal technicalities on how these 
laws work together, especially with complications that are revealed in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld. In this case, issues of war powers and domestic wiretapping in relation to 
citizens and combatants became contentious in determining whether they are applicable 
to U.S citizens living in the United States or to the U.S citizens in the theater of war 
outside the United States.134 
B. THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The UK has had a long history of dealing with terrorism, even before the 9/11 
attacks that significantly catapulted terrorism to the global map, with the initial response 
to terrorism being through conventional criminal law. The UK forms of terrorism carry 
different dimensions ranging from political, to religious, to ethnic, but more specifically, 
it lies in the conflict with the Irish nationalism.135 Therefore, the legal measures were 
purposely to respond to Irish Republicans who had waged a terrorist’s campaign against 
the United Kingdom. The British experience of dealing with terrorism was, in this case, 
limited mainly to the IRA, which had a big political bearing and was highly 
domesticated. As a result, the British government directed its efforts in trying to resolve 
IRA problems from a political perspective, even though in some other instances the legal 
approach would be used.  
However, when the IRA increased its attacks and the consequent failure of the 
British security apparatus to contain the situation, the British government was forced to 
pass a series of laws to tackle the problems of the IRA, laws that were primarily focused 
on terrorism cases. These laws were designed purposely to deal with terrorism that was 
being perpetuated by the IRA, limiting the UK to put in place a major overarching 
approach to counter-terrorism. However, when the problem of IRA terrorism was at its 
decline, the threat of radical Islamic-based terrorism emerged on the world scene on a 
very large scale, which necessitated the UK to give a serious attention to such problems. 
134 Neff, “Does (FISA+NSA),” 910. 
135 Morag, 71. 
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Several other acts have been passed, namely the Anti-Terrorism Crime and 
Security Act of 2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005, the Terrorism Act of 
2006, and the Counter Terrorism Act of 2008. For purposes of this research, I focus on 
the Anti- Terrorism Act of 2000 and Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ATCSA), 
which are taken as major legal laws in the fight against terrorism in the UK. 
1. UK Anti-Terrorism Act of 2000     
With the advent of the international/transnational terrorism on the scene, the UK 
was forced to develop laws so as to harmonize with the United States and the rest of the 
world in the war against terror. The significant terror attacks in terms of injuries and 
death happened during an attack on London’s transport system on July 7, 2005,136 
leading to the development of a new strategy for managing counterterrorism, commonly 
known as CONTEST.137 As a result, the UK registered several arrests and 
prosecutions.138 Terrorism laws in the UK have long been seen as a reaction to temporary 
and fragmented incidences forcing the country to keep shifting the laws on terrorism. 
However, since 2000, efforts to have a more unified approach have been sought 
with the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2000.139 This act, to a larger extent, 
replaced the previously used laws against terrorism orchestrated by IRA in the Northern 
Ireland. It helped to have uniform laws so as to bring together all the laws that were to be 
used in the fight against terrorism in the whole country since the country had started 
experiencing different forms of terrorism. Furthermore, the enactment of the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2000 meant that all bad laws that applied to the IRA were removed so 
as to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The compliance 
with the ECHR meant that holding terror suspects for longer periods without charge and 
136 Beckman, Comparative Legal Approaches, 76. 
137 Francis Richards, “The Development of the UK Intelligence Community after 9/11,” in 
International Terrorism Post-9/11 Comparative Dynamics and Responses (New York: Routledge, 2010), 
118.  
138 The UK CT strategy provides detailed statistics on arrests and prosecutions of suspected terrorists 
and terror threats. See 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97995/strategy-contest.pdf. 
139 Beckman, Comparative Legal Approaches, 59. 
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police arresting a person suspected of being a terrorist without a warrant could no longer 
be entertained because such actions would be in contravention of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. However, some the laws that were removed somehow 
resurfaced after the events of 9/11.  
Inasmuch as the act removed some of the laws with the aim of complying with the 
requirement of human rights laws, it did not significantly take away the existing law. In 
fact, the act widened the law in many ways, including by broadening the definition of 
terrorism whereby the offenses related to terrorism affect not only the perpetrators but 
also anyone who assists in committing the crime. In addition, the act put in place 
provisions relating to investigation of terrorist organizations, and any individual 
associated with that organization.140 Other than broadening the definition, the act 
increased the powers of police by both statute and common law in terms of carrying out 
surveillance, search, and seizure. Thus, it is worth noting that the Anti-Terrorism Act of 
2000 brought changes in what was lacking between balancing human rights and fighting 
terrorism.  
2. The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act of 2001 
The ATCSA was the UK legislative response enacted immediately after the 
events of 9/11. It was also done as a requirement to comply with the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373 (2001) on forfeiture and seizure of property of terrorists. Alongside the 
UN Security Resolution, the ATCSA was also enacted to ensure that UK laws are 
consistent with EU regulations concerning police and judicial cooperation in handling 
terrorism-related offenses.141 The law adds to the consolidated Anti-Terrorism Act of 
2000 by introducing clauses on dangerous substances and aviation security and also 
filling the gaps and loopholes that were not attended to in the Anti-Terrorism Act of 
2000.142 Unlike the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2000, the ATCSA gives wider powers to the 
police, customs, and immigration, especially for cash-related seizures, whose definition is 
140 Beckman, Comparative Legal Approaches, 60. 
141 Beckman, Comparative Legal Approaches, 69. 
142 Hewitt, The British War on Terror, 37.  
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also expanded.143 Curtailing terrorism financing has been identified as a key instrument 
in the quest for combating terrorism.  
The UK, through the ATCSA, introduced forfeiture and seizure of cash and 
property where freezing of such properties and cash could easily be carried out, including 
outside the UK, both for individuals and organizations. The biggest benefit has been the 
general nature of Sections 1–3 and the long title by not specifying that the act targets 
terrorism-related actions on United Kingdom’s economy, implying that it can be applied 
in non-terrorist situations.  
The act further provides for the disclosure of information for the purposes of 
investigation and criminal proceedings, including the confidential information held by 
public bodies, such as banks, insurance firms, and government bodies. This has been seen 
as a violation of the right to privacy. The ATCSA raised a number of key human rights 
concerns, the main one of which was the detention of suspects for a non-mandatory 
period without trial.144 Because of this kind of internment, some have argued that this law 
is “the most draconian law legislation Parliament has passed in peacetime in over a 
century.”145 By application, the Secretary of State could certify any non-British citizen as 
a terrorist and be detained indefinitely without sufficient admissible evidence for 
prosecution.146  
Relatedly, even the special advocates for such detainees, on top of being vetted 
first, couldn’t share with their clients the secret evidence the government relied on in 
appeals by foreign nationals detained indefinitely under anti-terrorism powers. Because 
of the inherent human rights challenges, this was to be later enhanced by use of the 
derogatory clauses that led to a declaration of a state of emergency so as to fit into the 
143 Paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 defines cash as coins and notes in any currency, postal orders, travelers’ 
cheques, bankers’ drafts, and such other kinds of monetary instruments as the Secretary of State may 
specify by order. 
144 Part 4 of the UK ATCTS Act. 
145 David Williams, “The United Kingdom’s Response to International Terrorism.” Ind. Int’l & Comp. 
L. Rev. 13, no. 3 (2003) https://journals.iupui.edu/index.php/iiclr/article/viewFile/17774/17957. 
146 Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Oxford, Princeton  
University Press,2004), 50. 
 52 
                                                 
ECHR definition.147 The special rules of evidence that permitted exclusion of the 
detainees and their legal representatives from proceedings were against the rules of a fair 
hearing.  
Such human rights violations attracted several cases against the processes and the 
law; hence, in 2004, the House of Lords declared the powers of detention were 
incompatible with the UK’s obligations under the ECHR.148 The Appellate House of 
Lords pronouncements could be summarized as follows: No detention pending 
deportation can last for more than seven days, let alone three years; deportation of terror 
suspects is not a solution but a continued transmission of terrorism; terrorism is not a 
preserve of foreign nationals, as about 30 percent of British citizens had been arrested; 
the law is unjustifiably discriminatory; uniform measures should be adopted irrespective 
of nationality; and there is no observable state of emergency threatening the nation. 
Similar views resonated with the 2002 ATCSA reviewing committee, which 
recommended that a review of Part 4 was not sustainable way of addressing the problem 
of terrorist suspects in the UK. It applied only to foreign nationals, and although the 
legislation is expressed in terms of international terrorism, the scope of the derogation 
from the ECHR means that it can be applied only to individuals with links to groups 
linked to Al-Qaeda. It should therefore be replaced or expanded.149 
The ATCSA further infringes on personal liberties through forcefully acquiring 
fingerprints and other identifying features from individuals so as to ascertain identity, 
which is another form of individual rights violations, the access and retention of data for 
purposes of national security in the hands of telephone and Internet providers. The 
powers could be misused, leading to misuse of the information collected. However, the 
147 Article 1 of the ECRH defines the Convention as an international treaty by which signatory states 
oblige themselves to secure certain rights to persons within their jurisdiction.  
148 “A (FC) and Others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) 
(2004); A and Others (Appellants) (FC) and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(Respondent) (Conjoined Appeals), [2005] UKHL 71, United Kingdom: House of Lords (Judicial 
Committee), 8 December 2005, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/439957d94.html [accessed 19 
February 2015]. 
149 Privy Review Committee. “Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Review: Report,” 
presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 122(5) of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 20, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/251096/100.pdf. 
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extension of operational areas to cover British Transport, railways lines, and government 
installations for the purposes of arresting any offenders, or seizing or preserving evidence 
relating to crime,150 is a positive move. 
Thus, it goes without saying that both of the UK Anti-Terrorism Acts have 
significantly revolutionized anti-terrorism laws in their operation. In effect, the acts 
expanded terrorism laws, which were initially limited to domestic terrorism based on the 
threats posed by the IRA. While dealing with the problems of IRA, the UK did not put 
issues of human rights and other concerns of civil liberties into consideration. The 
government was concerned with defeating the IRA without being mindful of civil 
liberties. However, with the introduction of these acts, the UK was able to remove the 
obnoxious laws and replace them with laws that were accommodative and consistent with 
the international requirements in handling terrorism-related cases. More importantly, 
these acts changed the legal language by empowering the law enforcement that led to the 
increased police investigative capacity, which helped judicially to prosecute terrorism 
related cases successfully.    
C. ALLIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
The war on terrorism requires concerted efforts, and at the same time it is not 
possible for the U.S. to have troops placed in every area suspected of harboring terrorists. 
Working with the allies and the support from the international community may solve 
some of the challenges, especially when it comes to intelligence collection and 
deployment of troops. Allies are better placed when it comes to fighting proxy wars 
because, in the first place, they use their own structures established, and at the same time 
they operate in a familiar and friendly environment, which is not the case with foreign 
troops. This option, therefore, has prompted the U.S. to establish strong relationships 
with countries that have expressed interests in the fight against terrorism. 
150 Part 10 of the ACTS Act. 
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1. Strengthening the Allies  
The U.S. approach in the fight against terrorism has been reinforced by 
strengthening its allies. This approach is supported by the UN Security Council to combat 
international terrorism, particularly in its Resolution 1373. Under this resolution, member 
states are encouraged to cooperate in combating terrorism. In addition, the United States 
has developed programs in the Trans-Saharan region, East African region, Maghreb 
region, and South and Central Asia, backed by the same resolution.  
Various programs and initiatives have focused on capacity building, technical 
assistance, detection, and denying terrorist safe havens from where they recruit, plan, and 
organize their activities. Through this approach, America has provided technical training 
to law enforcement agencies in investigations, development of counter-terrorism systems, 
and institutional responsiveness. In addition, border security has been supported, 
especially in the systems that can identify terrorists. For example, through the Personal 
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation Systems (PISCES) at almost every 
entry or exit point, Ugandan immigration can apprehend watch-listed individuals. 
Institutions in the rule of law and criminal justice agencies, especially in transitional 
states, have also benefited from the production of documents for good practice.  
2. NATO’s Involvement in Combating Terrorism 
The use of allies in the fight against terrorism does not stop at strengthening 
individual countries, but goes beyond to involve working with NATO member states that 
provide a shared platform for the promotion of freedom and security through political and 
military means. In line with this development, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
stipulates that an attack on any NATO member state intimates that all member states are 
under attack.151 This is the very reason why NATO was in action within a short spell of 
time after 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. NATO’s involvement was actually in 
the fulfillment of its legal obligation. The current war on terror in which the United States 
and the UK are involved is as a result of the direct terror threat two which NATO 
151 NATO, “NATO Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism,” May 12 2012, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87905.htm?selectedLocale=en . 
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member states are exposed. In an effort to protect its member states, NATO invoked 
Article 5 in support of its allies for the first time.152 Subsequently, NATO has had direct 
involvement in countries that are suspected of harboring and providing safe havens to 
terrorists and their organizations. The military operations especially in Afghanistan and 
Iraq have been heavily supported by NATO forces contrary to the perception that the 
United States and the UK are dominating in the war against the Islamic countries, as 
indicated by Stephen Walt’s study of U.S. policies.153 Despite this concern, the 
overwhelming success against the Taliban government in Afghanistan was out of 
NATO’s offensive action, which forced the Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants into disarray.  
NATO’s actions and approaches are based on the premise that the threat of 
terrorism is an international problem. Therefore, to deal with it, according to Florina 
Cristiana Matei, requires “collective political, economic and law enforcement measures, 
as well as military engagement.”154 This approach has been possible through 
strengthening cooperation with other members in the promotion of peace and security in 
countries where terrorism poses serious security threats. In this particular instance, 
NATO has been instrumental in striking and dismantling terrorist capabilities and their 
networks. The engagement in the fight against terrorism is one of NATO’s cardinal 
missions, on top of other international obligations incidental to the safety of its members 
in times of crisis.  
3. European Union Role in Combating Terrorism
The European Union is among the international bodies that are instrumental in the 
field of fighting international terrorism. Its efforts are embedded in the framework of the 
European security strategy, which is based on respect of human rights and international 
152 Florina Cristiana Matei, “Combating Terrorism and Organized Crime: South Eastern Europe 
Collective Approaches,” in Bilten Slovenske Vojske, ISSN1580-1993, UDK355.5(479.4)(055), 44. 
153 Stephen M. Walt, “Why They Hate Us (II): How Many Muslims Has the U.S Killed in the Past 30 
Years?” Foreign Policy, November 30, 2009. 
154 Matei, “Combating Terrorism and Organized Crime,” 44. 
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law.155 Through the development of the “European Security and Defence Policy” (ESDP) 
and the introduction of EU justice and home affairs policies (JHA), the EU has been able 
to have an institutionalized framework through which various bodies have been formed to 
respond to the challenges presented by transnational terrorism. Prominent among these 
bodies is the intelligence team composed of the EU’s military staff who are mandated to 
correct and secure classified information from the intelligences agencies of member 
states. The importance of this team in the fight against terrorism has been the increased 
intelligence cooperation and exchange, which has enabled joint assessment. 
Another body created by the EU is Europol. This agency is charged with the 
responsibility of enforcing offenses related to cross-border crimes. In addition, Europol 
has been instrumental in pursuing cases related to reported lost passports and other travel 
documents which are suspected to be in the wrong hands, and in implementing European 
arrest warrants.156 Other than dealing with the law enforcement, Europol follows 
terrorism activities in regard to financing terrorism, radicalization within the EU member 
states, and recruitment networks. In this area, Europol has provided a lot of actionable 
information related to terrorist activities, which has helped in building useful databases 
on terrorist activities shared between EU member states. 
In addition, through the EU initiatives, there has been practical improvement in 
areas that used to be vulnerable and favorable targets for terrorists. For instance, in the 
wake of heightened threats in aviation sector, the EU instituted advanced electronic 
security measures to protect aviation transport and borders. These measures have led to a 
drastic drop of terror incidents within aviation and in other means of transport. Coupled 
with these measures, EU member states made changes and improved travel documents to 
include advanced security features (bio-metrics) that make them difficult to forge, 
155 Graham Messervy-Whiting, “British Armed Forces and European Union Perspectives on 
Countering Terrorism,” in International Terrorism Post-9/11 Comparative Dynamics and Responses (New 
York: Routledge, 2010), 107. 
156 Jorg Monar, “The European Union’s Response to 11 September 2001: Bases for Action, 






                                                 
reducing the levels of forgeries in travel documents.157 In this respect, the EU has 
demonstrated rigor in the support of fighting international terrorism. 
4. Diplomacy 
Diplomacy is an instrument used by governments to implement their foreign 
policy as defined by their respective governments under international law. Terrorism as a 
cross-border crime requires high-level diplomatic approaches and negotiations to achieve 
support from other states and to obtain public support. However, the United States has 
relied more on military power after the 9/11 events in the fight against terrorism. Later, 
U.S. leadership realized that military power cannot be achieved in some cases without 
diplomatic means.  
Using its position at the UN Security Council, the United States has supported the 
efforts to fight terrorism. For example, under Security Council Resolution 1267, 
sanctions were placed on Al-Qaeda, obligating member states to freeze its assets and 
prohibit travel of its associates. Terrorism financing is one of the areas that the United 
States has prioritized with focus on establishing legal frameworks and regulatory 
systems. However, the use of military force has damaged the image of the United States, 
as reflected in the recent Gallup opinion poll158 and the Zogby international poll.159 
Scholars have argued that Americans use coercive diplomacy by use of military power, in 
which force is used as a political diplomatic strategy.160 The comprehensive legal 
framework of the United States has been the justification of its strategies.  
157 Messervy-Whiting, “British Armed Forces and European Union Perspectives,” 109. 
158 The Poll Was Conducted in Muslim Countries. For details, see Gallup/USA Today, “Global 
Opposition to U.S. Drone Strikes Grows,” July 14, 2014, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/07/14/pew-global-drones-snowden-nsa/12628661 ; and 
Zogby International, “The Ten Nations Impressions of America Poll,” April 11, 2002; Pew Research 
Center, “America Admired, Yet Its New Vulnerability Seen as a Good Thing, Say Opinion Leaders,” 
December 19, 2001; “Americans and Europeans Differ Widely on Foreign Policy Issues,” April 20, 2002, 
www.people-press.org; and Richard Morin, “Islam and Democracy,” Washington Post, April 28, 2002. 
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Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 29, no. 3 (1987): 195–215, 
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D. CONCLUSION  
The United States and the UK have in their strategies for counterterrorism a 
strong legal framework with the Patriot Act and the Anti-Crime and Security Act of 
2001, respectively, among the most pronounced laws. These laws were put in place as a 
reaction to the 9/11 terror attacks. The two anti-terror laws have been heavily criticized 
for infringing on individual human rights, especially freedom of association, liberty, 
religion, and privacy. Despite the criticism, these strategies have had to endure; their 
applications have registered a tremendous success in the fight against terrorism. For 
instance, some of the rogue states suspected of sponsoring terrorist organizations have 
been dealt with, and their leaders have been dethroned through the use of military force. 
One other success has included the capture and killing of Osama Bin Laden, the Al-
Qaeda leader who claimed responsibility for 9/11 attacks. In addition, the U.S. 
government and its allies have steadily gained the upper hand over terrorists to the extent 
that it has not been possible for Al-Qaeda to carry out any other attack of 9/11 magnitude 
for the last ten years.  
Nevertheless, the power vacuum left behind in states where the leaders have been 
dethroned seems to be creating a new form of terrorism, a situation that is currently being 
witnessed in Iraq. On the basis of this challenge, it becomes difficult to imagine a 
solution that does not include military intervention. However, the challenges 
notwithstanding, these two countries are lessons learned for Uganda’s efforts as an 
emerging democracy to counter terrorism.   
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IV. COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE LIBERTY–SECURITY
TRADEOFF IN UGANDA: QUO VADIS? 
Fighting terrorism in a democratic society poses distinct challenges, particularly 
when policies embraced by governments are interpreted to be undemocratic in the way 
they are executed. The main claim of critics is that in the process of implementing these 
policies, governments unintentionally infringe on people’s rights and freedoms because 
the immediacy and urgency of security considerations preempt the niceties of civil 
liberties. This claim, according to English, is overstated by many scholars who subscribe 
to the view that governments institute policies in a hasty manner without due 
consideration of the root causes of terrorism.161 Either way, both democratic and 
democratizing states have the obligation to protect their citizens from the heinous acts of 
terrorists, and the best way to do so is to put policies in place that support and are 
supported by the democratic values of the society.  
This chapter assesses Uganda’s current anti-terrorism policies and their effects on 
democratization’s requirements of freedom, transparency, human rights and liberties. It 
further offers recommendations for Uganda, based on the lessons learned from United 
States and UK experiences, which may help policy makers strike a better security/ 
transparency balance.  
A. POLICY ANALYSIS—AND EFFECTS 
Democracy, by its definition, allows citizens to act freely without being unduly 
restricted by government actions (policies). It promotes the rule of law and encourages 
institutions to operate without government interventions. Additionally, democratization 
of a given society is also influenced by various factors, including the involvement of civil 
society in shaping the political landscape; political society; rule of law; and 
bureaucracy.162 Civil society, which includes groups ranging from non-government 
organizations (NGOs) to students’ organizations, to trade unions, help in monitoring 
161 English, Terrorism, 118. 
162 Linz and Stepan, 7. 
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government programs especially in areas of accountability, transparency, human rights 
issues, conflict resolution, and the rehabilitation of war victims.  
However, such relationships may not always function as described especially in a 
country whose democracy is perpetually disturbed by terrorist activities. Such a situation 
creates the need for the government to put policies in place to mitigate acts of terrorism, 
which in their way of functioning restricts the freedom necessary for democratic process. 
As way of striking a balance between security and civil liberties, these policies need to be 
seen functioning within the legal framework without comprising the country’s security 
and civil liberties. Consequently, the government of Uganda in its effort to combat 
terrorism, while promoting and maintaining the rule of law, carried out several legal 
reforms and policies geared towards strengthening the existing laws and institutions in 
the fight against terrorism. Prominent among these changes was the enactment of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act 2002, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Interceptions of 
Communications Act, and other legal reforms that included border controls and police 
reforms. 
1. Balancing Transparency/Liberty/HR and Security: The Legal
Framework
Under this legal framework, the Anti-Terrorism Act has been viewed to be 
granting overwhelming powers to enforcement officers, which the public sees as a 
violation of civil liberties, eroding constitutionally mandated checks and balances.163 
This contradiction is a major challenge for democratizing states like Uganda because 
balancing counterterrorism legislation with constitutionally guaranteed human rights is 
often problematic.164   
This tension is best illustrated by a case in which terrorism charges were leveled 
against 29 persons who allegedly burnt down a police station in a Kampala suburb during 
a riot in September 2009.165 This riot, however, did not have any connection with 
163 Brigitte L. Nacos, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism,” 212. 
164 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 117. 
165 Andrew Bagala, “Uganda: Riot Suspects Face Terrorism Charges,” Daily Monitor September 22, 
2009. 
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terrorism; the population was protesting the central government’s prevention of a cultural 
leader from visiting one of the neighboring counties. Bringing terrorism charges against 
people who demonstrate also raises human rights concerns.   
Some actions backed by the Act require a precise legal definition to avoid this 
kind of contradiction as in Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).166  In as much as this contradiction exists within the law, still the 
Ugandan judicial system accords a fair trial to suspects as required by the constitution, 
leave alone the demands of human rights activists who act as potential advocates for civil 
liberties. For instance, though the initial charge of the mentioned case may have been 
inappropriate, still suspects were accorded a fair trial leaving the law to determine 
whether the charges were correctly applied. Chapter 4, Article 28 of the Ugandan 
constitution grants every citizen a right to a fair hearing.167   
In addition, issues of constitutional rights have been raised by foreign terrorist 
suspects who are to be extradited from one jurisdiction to another.168 In Uganda, the 
suspected terrorists involved in the twin bomb explosions on July 11, 2010, challenged 
their extradition from Kenya and Tanzania. The suspects argued that their extradition to 
Uganda was unconstitutional because proper procedures that would guarantee their rights 
as protected by the constitutions of their respective countries were not followed.169 
However, the court ruled that their trial in Uganda could stand because there was no 
extradition. It held that “the alleged illegalities cannot be attributed to Uganda. This was 
because the respective Police [of Kenya and Tanzania] voluntarily surrendered the 
petitioners. There is no demonstration of proof of conspiracy in the extradition.”170 
Therefore, their trial could still stand, as Kenya was voluntarily cooperating and not 
compelled by any extradition treaties. However, there still remains no act to streamline 
166 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations,  999-1-14668 (December 1966). 
167 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda.
168 Morag, Comparative Homeland Security Global Lessons, 63. 
169Hillary Nsambu, “Terror Suspects Challenge Extradition to Uganda,” New Vision Newspaper, 
November 18, 2011.   
170Anthony Wesaka, “Kampala Twin Bombers Trial Halted,” The Daily Monitor, November 18, 2011.   
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mutual legal assistance between Uganda and other countries. This gap poses challenges 
to handling of requests for assistance for evidence from foreign partners.  
The Anti-Money Laundering Act raises its own concerns vis-à-vis 
democratization in Uganda, namely that the law breaches the agreement of client 
confidentiality, which requires that banks must keep their clients’ transactions in secrecy. 
By allowing third parties to get access to anyone’s transactions, the Act greatly 
undermines the doctrine of fair hearing and the rule of law. Despite this weakness, the 
financial regulations are managed within the legal framework which in itself has 
implications on the development of democratization making it a matter of rule of law as 
opposed to draconian means which are not backed by the principles of democracy. For 
instance, rights to privacy outlined in Chapter 4 Article 27 section (2) of the Ugandan 
constitution, which states that “no person shall be subjected to interference with the 
privacy of that person’s home, correspondence, communication or other property.”171 
Specifically with respect to financial intervention, the Act presents some 
challenges with regard to the informal economy and the democratization process. In the 
first place, the informal sector provides employment to a big section of unemployed 
population that is currently engaged in economic and income generating activities 
including mobile money services. In the effort to regulate such activities (informal 
sector), the government must ensure that it does not deny its population the source of 
income. Regulating these activities within the legal framework in itself, promotes 
democracy because the population will not be denied the ability to improve its standard 
of living. On the other hand, interfering with peoples’ sources of income may jeopardize 
the process of democratization because it acts as a disincentive that encourages the 
population to engage in terrorism activities. 
In addition, the fight against terrorism has been punctuated with human rights 
questions that range from curtailing of civil liberties to killing of innocent civilians. The 
interception of Communications Act has also equally affected the democratization 
process especially in the manner in which it is applied. It has been seen as a means of 
171 Chapter 4 Art 27 Sec 2 of Ugandan Constitution. 
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curtailing individual rights of freedom of expression. The Interception of 
Communications Act raises a number of human rights issues for a democracy.172 It has 
been seen as a means of curtailing individual rights freedom of expression and privacy, 
which contravenes the Constitution.173  In the fight against organized crime and 
terrorism, modern police and intelligence agencies use information and surveillance 
technology, including phone tapping. This act potentially affects numerous innocent 
citizens who have nothing to do terrorism cases. It also constitutes far-reaching 
interference with the right to privacy and data protection. Ample examples of this issue 
appear in the media reports and complaints at the Uganda Human Rights Commission 
(UHRC) relating to interception of communication and surveillance.   
The same issue was raised by General David Tinyefuza, a high-profile 
government official, who complained about phone tapping after his failed bid to resign 
from the army in 1997.174 In addition, members of Parliament (MPs) from the opposition 
parties were up in arms with the government for allegedly tapping their mobile phone 
conversations without real security motive to do so. This incident came after the 
Parliament was informed on September 8, 2003, that intelligence intercepted a 
conversation between an opposition MP and a rebel commander of the LRA.175 Coupled 
with this complaint, media reports indicated that the opposition politicians were accusing 
172 Posner, Not a Suicide Pact, 144. 
173 Constitution of Republic of Uganda, Article 27(2) of the 1995 states that no person shall be 
subjected to interference within the privacy of their homes, correspondence, communication or other 
property. 
174 In 1997, the general Tinyefuza was summoned by the Parliamentary Sessional committee on 
Defence and Internal Affairs to testify before the committee in connection with civil strife in northern 
Uganda. In the course of his testimony, the general made a stinging attack on the Uganda peoples’ Defense 
forces in its handling the insurgency in northern Uganda. His critics were widely reported by the media and 
press. However, such criticisms did not go down well with some senior government and army officials who 
reportedly said that the general was “up to something.” During the same period, Tinyefuza denounced the 
system and tried to retire from the army. See R. Kakungulu – Mayambala, “Phone –tapping and the Right 
to Privacy: A Comparison of the Right to Privacy in Uganda and Canada available at 
http://www.bileta.ac.uk/content/files/conference%20papers/2008/Phone-
tapping%20and%20the%20Right%20to%20Privacy%20[Ronald%20Kakungulu].pdf.. 
175 Badru D Mulumba and Emmanuel Mugarura, “MP  Ogwala to sue Museveni; Protests tapping her 
phone,”  The Daily Monitor Newspaper, October 4, 2013. 
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the state intelligence operatives and agencies of phone tapping at the height of the 2001 
Presidential and Parliamentary campaigns.176  
The unwarranted interception of telephone conversations not only denies people 
freedom of communication, but such acts greatly affect the process of democratization. 
However, the use of legal means in tackling terrorism has registered moderate success. It 
has been argued that criminal prosecution and the detention of terrorist suspects disrupts 
their networks.177  In the case of Uganda, such methods have been effective in 
apprehending, prosecuting and convicting suspected terrorists. For instance, Edrisa 
Nsubuga and Mohamed Nsubuga, the perpetrators of the twin Kampala bombings, have 
been convicted and sentenced to 25 and five years, respectively, and another 85 terror 
suspects are still on trial.178  
As a counterbalance to all previous laws, the Constitution of Uganda forms the 
basic foundation through which all forms of laws in the country are regulated. First and 
foremost, the constitution advocates for protection and promotion of fundamental and 
other human rights and freedoms to the citizens of the Republic of Uganda. This premise 
forms a basis through which the balance can be attained. The constitution provides for 
legal systems to address injustice within the public, by allowing citizens fair trials and 
due process. To ensure that such activities are legally conducted, judicially, parliament, 
civil society and the media are constitutionally mandated to be part of the procedure in 
every incident that takes place in the country. In addition, Article 52 of the Ugandan 
constitution mandates Human Rights Commission (HRC) to receive all complaints and 
information pertaining to violations of human rights and freedoms in the country, 
compile, and publish periodic reports on its findings. The powers of this commission 
provide a levelled ground on which counter-terrorism laws can function and maintain 
balance between democratization’s demands and the demands of security. 
176  This complaint was lodged by Col (rtd) Dr. Kizza- Besigye at the Uganda Human Rights 
Commission (UHRC) on alleged phone tapping by the state during the 2001 Presidential and Parliamentary 
campaigns in which he contested as the Reform Agenda (RA) presidential candidate.  
177 Paul Wilkinson,113. 
178 Edward Anyoli and Farooq Kasule, “July 2010 Bomb Suspects Face Trail,” New Vision 
Newspaper, November 11th 2011. 
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2. Balancing Freedom of Movement with Border Control Policies 
Notwithstanding the good intentions for border controls, freedom of movement 
has been greatly affected by reforms introduced within immigration systems. However, 
considerations of these reforms have been as a result of increased security threats within 
immigration forming a basis for the government to initiate border control measures. 
These controls are geared towards having immigration system with tight security controls 
that enable the travelling public to gain confidence, and to bar individuals with ulterior 
motives from entering the country illegally. These reforms involve: Border patrols, 
border fencing, issuance of entry visas, and setting up security check points along the 
borders. In an effort to enforce these reforms, some individual freedoms and rights have 
been infringed on especially the freedom of movement, which contravenes Article 29 of 
the constitution that guarantees freedom of movement of people. The hassles that the 
travelling public experiences along the borders do not resonate well with expectations of 
fundamental human rights as enshrined in the Ugandan constitution.  
Border patrols, stop-and-search operations as well as targeting of religious, racial 
and tribal groups are the main activities that are considered to be conflicting with liberties 
and human rights. This scrutiny has mainly affected the Muslim community members 
across the East African countries, and people with tribal connections have also been 
targeted. In Uganda, the Somali community has been targeted mainly due to its 
connections with Somalia where Al-Shabaab militants are currently causing havoc. In 
addition, individuals from countries that have connections with terrorist networks are also 
among targeted individuals within the travelling public and along the borders.   
As a way of countering these excesses and the temptations of undermining the 
rule of law while trying to enforce border reforms, there are constitutional mechanisms 
that provide favorable grounds through which individual civil liberties are guaranteed. 
The media and the Human Rights Commission, by virtual of their constitutional 
obligations, play an important role   in ensuring that people’s liberties are preserved even 
when some individuals are caught on the wrong side of the law. The media and HRC are 
in a position to monitor, highlight and expose such violations and excesses. In the 
process, the balance between security and civil liberties will inevitably be attained—and 
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maintained—because these two institutions not only act as watchdogs for liberties, 
freedoms, and human rights, but also keep on reminding and pressuring the government 
when issues of human rights abuses crop up. This act in itself is a good indicator that in 
as much as the government would like to institute reforms with the aim of maintaining 
security, still these reforms must conform to democratic principles.   
3. Balancing Civil Liberties with Security Forces (Police, Military, and 
Intelligence) 
Currently, Uganda has an active Parliament that has presided over the passing of 
enabling laws in the promotion of democracy. Coupled with the legislation, other 
institutions of government like the police, military and intelligence services have been 
boosted. As a result, these institutions are showing a growing trend and are functioning as 
intended along democratic lines of accountability and transparency. The police, for 
instance, have carried out reforms that have enabled the force to be one the effective 
institutions and the lead agency in the fight against terrorism and the promotion of law 
and order in the country. In addition, with increased advocacy of internal democracy and 
accountability engineered by the civil society, the government of Uganda carried out 
transformation of the existing institutions in the bid to promote the rule of law. As a 
result of this transformation, independent bodies responsible for the governance and 
oversight controls have been created to monitor and regulate the activities of armed 
forces, police and intelligence services while executing their functions.  
For instance, Ugandan parliament established a sessional Committee on defense 
and internal affairs and mandated it to directly oversee the activities and programs of 
armed forces, police and intelligence services.179 This committee is charged with the 
responsibility of ensuring that the armed forces, the police and intelligence services 
maintain discipline and follow the code of conduct as enshrined in the constitution. With 
this effort in place, together with the watchful eyes of both domestic and international 




                                                 
media, operational methods of all security agencies have been restrained and 
consequently excesses of human rights concerns have been truncated.   
On the military front, the involvement of Ugandan forces in peace keeping 
missions has not only put Uganda in the spotlight but also enhanced the capacity of 
UPDF to respond to terror attacks as well as being among the leading countries in the 
fight against terrorism on the African continent.180 Through the military interventions, 
the LRA and ADF have been tremendously weakened to the extent that they no longer 
have the capacity to carry out any attack on the Ugandan soil. This situation had ever 
been experienced in most parts of the country for the last two and half decades.  
B. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE U.S AND UK’S EXPERIENCES 
Over a period of time, the United States and the UK have been faced with 
problems of terrorism but have managed to prevail over them through various 
approaches. As such, the experience of these countries forms a basis through which 
Uganda can learn lessons and help it deal with its current threats of both domestic and 
international terrorism. Throughout the campaign of global war on terror, these countries 
have embraced and maintained the notion of rule of law that is one of the main features 
of liberal democracies. These countries have developed institutions, advanced, 
technology and resources that they have committed in the fight against terrorism.  
On the other hand, the United States, and the UK in their quest to fight terrorism 
have also had their share of human rights violation criticisms. The U.S. ‘targeted killing 
policy’ irrespective of whether one is in armed conflict or not clearly brings out the 
amorphous nature of the global fight against terror that doesn’t respect international 
armed conflict principles. The case of Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen is for example to some 
extent regarded as extra-judicial killings and a constitutional violation of rights. The 
violation of human rights by U.S. and UK forces of its supported foreign troops 
compromises the fight against terrorism and affects support for the alliance. This 
violation has been noted in the way suspected terrorist trails have been handled in these 
180 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa 
Overview,” Country Reports of Terrorism 2013 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2014)  11–
54, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf . 
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countries. The UK has for example been grappling with the extradition of radical Islamic 
cleric Abu Qatada. The European Court of Human Rights overturned the ruling by the 
British courts when it held that Abu Qatada cannot be deported for fear that he will not 
get a fair trial in Jordan. The UK Prime Minister was quoted by the Daily Telegraph 
casting the human rights concept thus …. 
The whole concept of human rights laws is in danger of becoming 
“distorted” and “discredited” because of the court’s decisions. “We do 
have a real problem when it comes to foreign national who threaten our 
security…. The problem today is that you can end up with someone who 
has no right to live in your country, who you are convinced – and have 
good reason to be convinced – means to do your country harm. And yet 
there are circumstances in which you cannot try them, you cannot detain 
them and you cannot deport them. ….So having put in places every 
possible safeguard to ensure that (human rights) rights are not violated, we 
still cannot fulfil our duty to our law-abiding citizens to protect them.”181   
Despite this challenge, the two countries have persisted in the fight against terrorism 
arguing they will not relent until terrorism is defeated and its ideology uprooted.        
The 9/11 events occurred when both the United States and the UK were already 
involved in in several campaigns which had terrorist components. The United States for 
instance had witnessed several terror incidents both internal and external targeting its 
interest abroad like the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, or the U.S. embassy 
bombings in parts of Africa. Other than being involved in handling terror incidents, the 
United States had also been earlier involved in different campaigns against terrorism in 
both Africa and Middle East countries examples of such campaign included the bombings 
in Libya and Sudan.  
The UK on the other hand has also been engaged in a domestic campaign against 
the IRA for a long period. Nevertheless, post-9/11, the UK has also been targeted by 
international terrorist groups, the July 2005, bombings serve as a good example. In this 
regard, given the number of terror incidents, the levels of threats these countries managed 
to deal with, and the approaches these countries have used in battling the scourge of 




                                                 
terrorism in their respective countries certainly offers lessons for countries facing the 
problem of terrorism to learn from.  
One of the key approaches used by the United States and the UK in tackling the 
threat of terrorism has been military intervention. These interventions target countries 
where terrorists have safe havens, likely breeding states, and rogue states that sponsor 
terrorist activities. This military strategy was widely advocated by President Bush 
immediately after 9/11 as he argued that the best way to fight terrorism was to take the 
fight abroad rather than fighting it on American soil.182 Despite its flaws, the military 
approach has had enormous success in killing and capturing top terrorist leaders. Using 
similar approach, Uganda used military intervention to fight terrorism in countries where 
terrorist groups were posing a serious security threat to the Ugandan government. 
Through the use of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces, Uganda has conducted several 
military campaigns in two neighbouring states, the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Sudan, which were facilitating and providing safe havens for the ADF and the LRA 
terrorists groups.  
Through the initiatives espoused by the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), a regional body for the promotion of peace and security in the 
Horn of Africa, Uganda was allowed to enter Sudan and conduct military operations. In 
2002, Sudan and Uganda signed a protocol known as the Kampala Declaration to allow 
the UPDF to pursue the LRA on the Sudanese territory.183 With this agreement, Ugandan 
troops got involved in military operations outside Ugandan borders, as most of the battles 
against the LRA were fought on the Sudan territory.   
Other than the military approach, the United States and UK used the legislative 
approach by adopting new laws to deal with the problem of terrorism on the legal front. 
The essential focus of these laws (discussed in detail in Chapter III) was to streamline all 
legal challenges of combating terrorism and filling in gaps in institutional measures in the 
quest for providing a legitimate way of dealing with the threat of terrorism. Thus, 
182 Beckman, Comparative Legal Approaches, 39. 
183 Mareike Schomeius, “The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A history and Overview.” 
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-08-LRA.pdf. 
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domestically, when terrorists are arrested in these countries, the criminal charges can be 
handled within prescribed laws.   
This is yet another lesson Uganda should learn from both the United States and 
the UK. Whatever the criticisms the new laws were subjected to, still they were operating 
within the democratic systems. Thus, Uganda passed and adopted the Ant-Terrorism Act 
of 2000 based on a similar premise. The new Act created new specific offences related to 
terrorism as opposed to the previous general charge of treason that had been used in 
Uganda. The new law however, did not emerge out of the blue; it went through legal 
procedures like it was the case with the U.S. Patriot Act and the UK ATCSA. 
Having well-functioning and strong institutions in place is one important factor 
that has enabled the United States and UK to contain the scourge of terrorism. The main 
focus of their efforts has been to empower and strengthen the enforcement agencies and 
immigration institutions with the view of closing the gaps within the existing institutions 
to match the current level of threats. The United States and the UK carried out structural 
reforms that saw the amalgamation of different security agencies and strengthened them. 
In addition, other overarching reforms were also instituted within the immigration 
systems to deny terrorists opportunities to sneak into the country undetected and to 
transfer weapons and explosives. 
The importance of carrying out institutional reforms was a lesson that could not 
escape Uganda’s attention as way of strengthening its CT efforts. This is because most 
democratizing states have not developed the capabilities of their forces to reach a level of 
proficiency which enable them execute sophisticated missions like the American 
specialized forces. Thus, the creation of Police Counter-Terrorism unit within the 
mainstream police and the Joint Anti-Terrorism unit (JAT) composed of personnel from 
different security agencies are two examples of reforms carried out based on the U.S. and 
UK model. As a result of this consideration, Uganda has been able to benefit from most 
of the U.S. and UK programs, especially from the law enforcement and military 
assistance inform of training and equipment as way of promoting institutional building 
and reforms.   
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The legislative select committees of the United States and UK have benefits of 
scrutiny and budget approvals and appropriations with limited political interference, 
individual willingness to participate in oversight and to withhold confidential information 
obtained in the course of their work. In Uganda, some of such operations are classified 
implying that the legislative committee cannot access any of such information on 
operations and budgets as in the case of the United States and the UK. This is done 
presumably to avoid leakages and to safe guard sensitive information on defence matters 
hence leaving it under the oversight of the executive. The intelligence services of the 
United States and the UK are some of those with more oversight and control systems. 
Having a similar oversight function in Ugandan intelligence services marks a big step in 
the democratization process. 
C. CONCLUSION: WHAT DOES THE BALANCE LOOK LIKE? 
To be sure, democratic system in Uganda cannot be comparable to the United 
States or UK, which have centuries of settled democracy on the record. Uganda has 
recently transitioned from a military junta to multi-party system and still struggles with 
lingering influences and weak opposition. In contrast, the United States and the UK for 
example have strong intelligence oversight systems. The common oversight systems 
include parliamentary oversight, judicial oversight, media and civil society Organisations. 
These serve as a control mechanism and stand for accountability. The commonly used 
oversight system is the legislative committee. Whereas in the United States, the 
committee has a mandate covering policy, administrations operations and legality, in 
Uganda it does not cover operations and legality as it does not cover legality in the UK.  
It is also worth noting that anti-terrorism laws in Uganda (as elsewhere) are broad 
in their implementation. As a result, counterterrorism policies inevitably affect civil 
society in a number of ways. For example, whereas civil society advocates for free 
expression and assembly, anti-terrorism policies on the other hand may directly or 
indirectly limit free assembly or public gatherings. This is because a free society without 
legal restrictions compromises the security of the state as in most cases, terrorists take 
advantage of the laxity within the laws as was in the case of the July 2010 Kampala 
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bombings. This incident revealed the extent of security laxity forcing the government to 
institute legal and security hardening measures in all urban centres and all entry points 
(borders) with view of denying terrorists any kind opportunity to strike without being 
detected. These measures limited any form of public gatherings, assembly, access to 
public places and government installations. For instance, all proprietors of public places 
are required to put in place deterrence security measures at their own cost. 
In order to strike and keep the balance between freedom and security, some legal 
measures with respect to freedom of association and public gatherings, have been 
considered with the introduction of the Public Order Management Bill (POM), which 
requires anyone intending to hold any gathering and demonstrations to seek permission 
from police and inform any other relevant state security organs.184 Despite the 
restrictions, which according to critics within civil society argue that such restrictions 
compromise the principles of democracy, the bill provides an environment that allows 
freedom of expression and association by providing the necessary security for any kind of 
public gathering.  
Furthermore, these restrictions on public gathering and assembly do not extend to 
the press and the media, which remain free. Uganda has a wide range of radio stations, 
televisions and a variety of newspapers where citizens can freely express their views. 
Based on the preceding analysis, one could conclude that currently, for Uganda, the 
liberty/freedom/human rights/transparency versus security balance is heavier on security 
due to threats levels  the country has been experiencing for the last two and half decades. 
As legal scholars Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule observe, “any increase in security 
requires a decrease in liberty.”185    This same argument gives a clear understanding why 
the balance in Uganda is heavier on security side.   
Better still, Uganda has an active civil society that is  at the forefront of ensuring 
that government is delivering services and is also involved in championing the fight 
against corruption, the eradication of poverty as well as the promotion of election 
184  Article 19, Uganda: Public Order Management Act, October 2013, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/527b6cd74.html [accessed 19 February 2015]. 
185  Solove, Nothing to Hide, 34. 
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monitoring.186  In addition, as a way of promoting the rule of law, civil society demands 
government to involve the public in its own security by providing it with information 
about potential threats and to give it assurances of how such threats will be handled. The 
linkage between the state and civil society is that civil society fosters the process of 
democratization in the way it actively participates in the formulation of public policy and 
law reform processes. Such actions have the potential to promote and encourage the rule 
of law that is one of the prerequisites of a democratic state.   
186 Apollo N. Makubuya and Maureen Nakirunda, Report of a study on the civil society in Uganda 
(Oslo, Norway: NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, 2011), 1–50 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=109374. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the time the Uganda started experiencing security threats emanating from 
both domestic and transnational terrorism, it adopted various approaches to combat the 
threat. As in any other democratizing state (as well as in the established democracies), 
these counter-terrorism policies have prompted concerns and dissent in regard to civil 
liberties.  
A. COUNTERTERRORISM AND FREEDOM—NOT AN EITHER-OR 
PROPOSITION 
Whereas most laws define terrorism, acts of terrorism, and terrorism activities, 
Golder and William observe that the laws differ in range, scope, and application.187 States 
have created sanctions and increased state management of terror acts by defining 
considered terrorist groups, financial support of terrorists, and increasing surveillance on 
suspected terrorists. In Uganda, increased surveillance created resentment among the 
population who argued that the new laws were taking away their civil liberties. Despite 
this outcry, Uganda has used its criminal justice model to try and convict suspected 
terrorists. However, the government of Uganda is still facing legal challenges relating to 
human rights and jurisdiction.  
In addition, the fight against terrorism across the world has generated debate 
irrespective of the mode of approach or the level of development of countries involved. 
The UN and other international and regional bodies have provided legal forums that have 
been supportive in the fight against terrorism globally. The ways in which the United 
States and the UK have fought global terrorism have been appreciated and criticized in 
equal measures.   
It has been a challenge globally to protect human rights and combat terrorism 
because the laws, policies, and practices adopted in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks have 
undermined human rights in some cases. The new laws contain clauses of arbitrary 
187B. Golder and G. Williams, “What is ‘Terrorism’? Problems of Legal Definition, Problems of Legal 
Definition” University of New South Wales Law Journal 22, no. 2 (2004): 270. 
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detention as in the UK’s ATCSA that allows segregation based on nationality, and long-
term isolation of suspects. Indiscriminate attacks on civilians, breeds resentment and is a 
violation of their human rights.  
Military intervention has been associated with human rights abuses and extra 
judicial killings. On top of this, military actions have failed to completely defeat 
terrorism and terrorist networks. With respect to legislative responses, there has been 
strong criticism of the ways the law may violate civil liberties. This criticism has created 
public resentment and alienated the population, which undermines the democratic 
process.  
In the area of international compliance, the on-going challenge has been 
translating international conventions into judicial framework. For instance, terrorism 
cases involving criminal prosecution and extradition are still presenting difficulties to 
local courts as in the case of Kenyan terror suspects being tried in Ugandan courts of law.   
Finally, these counterterrorism measures in total have been perceived by detractors as 
serving U.S. and U.K. agendas only, and involving the rest of the world in a war that does 
not serve individual nations’ interests. The UN resolution on Human Rights at the 57th 
session is a step in the right direction, but compliance especially by powerful states such 
as the United States and UK has been inconsistent.  
The question remains. How can terrorism be fought without the government 
overstepping on the peoples civil liberties? The International Court of Justice best 
summaries this dilemma: 
Countering terrorism is itself a human right objective, since states have a 
positive obligation to protect people under their jurisdiction against 
terrorist acts. This positive duty on states requires them to prevent, punish, 
investigate and redress the harm caused by such acts. At the same time 
states must accept that this positive duty to protect applies both to those 
who may be at risk from terrorism and those who may be suspected of 
terrorism. The state has no authority in law to determine that some people 
do not qualify to have their rights respected.188 
188 Assessing Damage , Urging Action, Report of the Eminent Jurist Panel on Terrorism, Counter 
Terrorism  and Human Rights (EJP Report), 2009, 16. 
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In other words, protecting human rights in anti-terrorism legislation should go beyond a 
legal requirement. It should be in real practice.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Uganda must focus on revising its laws to consider the merging trends and modes 
of terrorism. The experiences gained in the field, through international exposure, and by 
global practices should be incorporated to minimize the existing gaps in the legal system. 
The United States closed such holes in its legal framework by enacting the Domestic 
Enhancement Act to cover gaps in the Patriot Act. The United Kingdom enacted the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005) to address the missing gaps in the ATCSA. 
Uganda urgently needs to strengthen neighborhood effect to avoid a relapse of 
some of the terrorist groups, especially the LRA and the ADF, operating in neighboring 
countries. The government must play an active role in stabilizing Uganda’s neighbors in a 
non-confrontational approach. Specifically, the Ugandan government must keep a close 
eye on South Sudan’s government following the civil war that was sparked by the 
nation’s two top leaders.  
More broadly, a joint anti-terrorism force could augment the IGAD’s effort to 
cover the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions. This effort will solve the problems 
of terrorists using neighboring states to launch attacks against Uganda and will ease the 
cross- border operations. The government should also initiate mutual legal agreement act 
with partner states.  
There is also a need for establishing a community-centered terrorism approach to 
generate public support because terrorism flourishes in communities that are not vigilant 
about their surroundings. Unlike Western countries, Ugandan communities are more 
bonded by association and belonging to a community. They can easily identify those who 
do not belong. 
Given the importance of police in the fight against terrorism, it is of paramount 
importance that the government of Uganda should as a matter of policy not only locate 
more resources for police force and its specialized units, but also need to provide 
 79 
necessary anti-terrorism training programs. Enhanced training can reduce the likelihood 
of or damage from terrorism incidents and must be prioritized in law enforcement efforts 
to combat terrorism.    
Uganda, like the United States and Britain, has experienced devastating acts of 
terrorism first- hand and, thus, has joined in leading the fight against violent extremism 
that threatens its democratic process. Without question, the laws and processes of Anti-
terrorism require constant and critical attention to ensure that they do not imperil 
Uganda’s hard-fought civil liberties. At the same time, even such criticism must 
acknowledge the crucial role that counterterrorism measures play in maintaining and 
promoting Ugandan democracy. The balance between security and liberty is not struck 
one: It is a matter of constant refinements according to the prevailing conditions in state 
and society. The Ugandan experience demonstrates this process. It is also the case that 
security and liberty are not diametrically opposed, and considered anti-terrorism 
measures can enhance both at the same time. Uganda must continue its efforts toward 
such security in its democracy.  
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